This year’s Olympic games come at a heightened moment for international conflict & terrorism. The games are happening in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the post-October 7 war in Gaza and during a time of an uptick in jihadist terrorism. Given recent repeated successful terror attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia by Islamist terrorists and a streak of sabotage operations by Russian agents across Europe. Paris during and around the Olympics is a ground zero for another attack of this kind when it’s gonna be in the world’s spotlight. The potential for a jihadi group or individuals inspired by a jihadi group to take the world’s attention with a potential attack or for Russia to try to embarrass France with acts of sabotage, both potentially with a cyber element, is very high.
This year’s Olympics, from late July through mid-August, come at a heightened moment for international conflict & terrorism. Not only are this year’s games happening in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the post-October 7 war in Gaza, which mobilize individuals to various strains of extremist ideologies, but we are also witnessing an uptick of Islamic terrorism (mainly related to Islamic State – Khorasan Province, which threatens to plot more attacks in Europe). Given recent repeated successful terror attacks in Iran, Turkey and Russia by Islamist terrorists and a streak of sabotage operations by Russian agents across Europe, Paris during and around the Olympics is a ground zero for another attack of this kind when it’s going to be in the world’s spotlight.
Terrorism at the Olympics is not unprecedented – there were attacks by Palestinian terrorists against Jewish athletes at the 1972 Munich games and by a lone actor political extremist against the 1996 Atlanta games. The current, ideational extremist environment, with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda both calling for Oct. 7-inspired attacks, makes it plausible that something similar could happen at the 2024 Paris Olympics. The French police have already foiled at least two plots directed at this year’s Olympics, one in April and the other in May. The first involved a young man from the Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya plotting to attack a stadium in Saint-Etienne that will host soccer games as part of the Olympics, while the second included the intent to carry out a suicide bombing during the games on behalf of the Islamic State. In one more recent plot, a Russian-Ukrainian bombmaker has been arrested in Paris, near where Ukrainian refugees have been taken in.
As far as French relations with Russia, the two countries have recently been involved in a diplomatic spat after which the stunned President of France Emmanuel Macron has claimed that Moscow plans to target this summer’s Paris Olympics, which is probably right. The spat was preceded by Macron stating that he is “not ruling anything out, because we are facing someone who is not ruling anything out. I have a clear strategic objective: Russia cannot win in Ukraine. If Russia wins in Ukraine, there will be no security in Europe.” Putin has warned of ‘serious consequences’ and since Russia is not in a position where it could or wants to risk direct military confrontation with NATO, Moscow is looking for an asymmetric response. France can thus expect an intensification of the Kremlin’s existing political warfare campaigns against it, ranging from cyberattacks to sabotage. While Russia’s nuclear threats for the West are largely considered bluster, former cyber tsar for the Obama administration Michael Daniel says the cyber risks for the Olympics have never been higher.
A few days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when France had just taken over the Presidency of the Council for the EU, a position that allows member states to take an agenda-setting and coordinating role among the 27 European states. In the weeks ahead of the invasion, France tried to place itself in the position to play a critical role – for example, through the deployments of its troops to NATO’s eastern flank. However, from mid-March 2022 onward France lost its credibility as a leader in European security. President Macron spent most of his political capital trying to vedge himself in the position of would-be mediator only to be repeatedly duped by Putin, on whose behalf Macron spoke up during the initial stages of Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, the military support from Paris towards Kyiv was lackluster – basically nonexistent compared to French military and economic power. However, that is water under the bridge as France reversed its course. France’s statements on Russia are now unambiguous and its military support for Ukraine is much more resolute. The French were the first (together with the British) to support Ukraine with long-range strike capability and President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly pushed the red lines in regard to Russia and to the overly cautious attitude of some of the European states.
In the wake of the French government’s discussion to potentially send military trainers and even before the recent decision on the provision of Mirage 2000-5 jet fighters to Ukraine, France’s Ministry of Defense has recently warned of possible sabotage attacks by Russia on French military sites this year. Our analysts agree, moreover, we posit that during the Paris Olympics, Russia is likely to target civilian targets in France as well, in order to embarrass the government for President Macron’s repeated comments, in which he suggested NATO could deploy NATO troops in Ukraine. There has been a real stepping up of Russian activity in the intelligence and shadow sphere, intensifying Russian political war on NATO, as the freshly inaugurated president Putin reshuffles his government to include more macroeconomists, who will be needed for the long war Russia clearly intends to fight in the coming years.
As past Russian threats trying to prevent Europe from providing Ukraine with military aid were revealed as bluffs, the Western risk appetite grew. But circumstances change and since we are moving into an even more tense period than before, we should expect Russia to try to strike back in a covert way and to attack the confidence of the Western public.
A host of European intelligence agencies have recently warned that Russia is plotting sabotage across NATO countries. European governments publicly declared that information was being shared through NATO security services which point to convincing information of Russian sabotage and political meddling being coordinated at scale. NATO issued a statement declaring its deep concern about growing “malign activities on allied territory” by Russia, citing what it said was an “intensifying campaign . . . across the Euro-Atlantic area”. The growing fear over Russia’s appetite for physical damage against its adversaries follows a spate of accusations against Russia over disinformation and hacking campaigns.
Recently, German-Russian nationals were arrested in Bayreuth, Bavaria, for allegedly plotting to attack military and logistics sites in Germany on behalf of Russia. Two men were charged in the UK in late April with having started a fire at a warehouse containing aid shipments for Ukraine on behalf of the Kremlin. In Sweden, security services are meanwhile investigating a series of recent railway derailments, which they suspect to be acts of sabotage caused by Russian agents. The Kremlin often uses civilians, predominantly criminals, recruited on social media networks and paid in cryptocurrency. Russian spymasters have also turned to Telegram, a popular social media app, for recruiting. These methods of recruiting amateur single-use agents are surprisingly successful. Earlier last month, a man was charged with an attempted act of terrorism on behalf of Russia in the Czech Republic, for allegedly trying to set public buses on fire. Before that, a Russian-speaking couple was arrested in France for stoking racial tensions through a campaign publicly targeting French Jews with the intention of both duping the Muslim community to attack the Jewish community and driving a wedge between the Christian French and Muslim French in response.
Two German-Russian dual nationals were recently arrested in Germany on suspicion of planning attacks on American military bases and other targets, shortly before caches of explosives were discovered buried along a special overland pipeline that supplies air force bases in Germany and after an air-defense systems factory in Germany caught fire in a suspicious incident, which Western security officials say was set by Russian saboteurs trying disrupt shipments of critical arms and ammunition to Ukraine, despite official ruling on the incident being caused by accident.
Since events like the Olympic Games are at once bid by the host nation to accrue soft power and the focus of global attention, any embarrassing scandals, technical glitches or unexpected blunders will be magnified as much by the legitimate media as Russian bots and trolls. In the current circumstances, with President Macron taking a hawkish stance on Russia and with Russian athletes banned from the Games, unless they can prove their opposition to the war (so far, only eight have), Moscow has plenty of incentives to attack the games.
Hackers linked to the Russian intelligence services disrupted the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea using a cyberattack to shut down a significant portion of the digital infrastructure being used to hold and broadcast the event and French officials are bracing for more such cyber attacks this year. At a minimum, Russia is preparing to target the Paris Olympics with information campaigns – or rather, these operations have already started.
Researchers have identified several Russian disinformation campaigns targeting public opinion around the Games, as well as the reputation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). These efforts are most likely linked to Russia and tracked as Storm-1679 and Storm-1099. The threat actors have utilized AI to generate images and text and spread false information and rumors about the games and corruption in the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The groups have also utilized a common Russian disinformation tactic of impersonating existing news outlets and credible sources to spread misinformation and propagate threats and fears of violence and terrorism around the games. The IOC barred Russian and Belarusian athletes from competing in the Games in October 2023, citing Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine as the reason.
The ongoing attempts to tarnish the games also include the creation of a fraudulent film called “Olympics Has Fallen”, mimicking the 2013 American political action thriller “Olympus Has Fallen”. Using fake AI-generated audio impersonating the actor Tom Cruise to imply his participation, the film disparaged the IOC leadership. It has been shared across social media, complete with bogus five-star reviews, stirring graphics of smoldering Olympic rings, and fake endorsements from fellow celebrities, such as David Beckham and Miley Cyrus. Some celebrities were even duped into recording real messages supporting “Tom”, via the site Cameo where people pay celebrities for personalized videos. Those videos were then deceptively edited into promotional material for the film.
The Russian bots are also jumping on existing conspiracies; while they did not invent the groundless rumour that Macron’s wife, Brigitte, is a transexual, for example, they have been enthusiastically amplifying them to undercut her husband’s attempts to bolster his tough guy credentials.
Russia has a highly developed lexicon for hybrid warfare and applies it systematically across all potential weapons, be that information, psychological operations or acts of physical sabotage. Suspected attacks that were planned or have taken place in the past two years include sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic; an arson attack in Britain, which triggered the expulsion of the Russian military attaché from the country; and a simultaneous cutting of two data cables that paralyzed part of the German railway system for hours. However, railways can be attacked remotely; Russia has a track record of attacking railways, including recent attempts to destroy the signaling systems on Czech railways via a hacking campaign. Given the prestige France derives from its TGV fast trains, we should expect the French railways to be a major target during the Olympic games.
Moreover, Russia will be attempting to assert its role as an intelligence superpower. In the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 600 Russian intelligence officers operating in Europe with diplomatic cover were ejected, dealing serious damage to the Kremlin’s spy network across the continent. Russian spies will thus turn to hackers for hire, criminals, and other proxies to cause disruption of the games. However, given the extent of damage to the Russian intelligence network, the Kremlin will likely boost the cyber operations element of its political war against NATO in general and France in particular; which should be expected to include attempts at cyber-enabled physical sabotage.
The 2024 Paris Olympic Games also face a significant threat from jihadist hacktivists, who could target critical infrastructure, including transportation systems, power grids, and communication networks, potentially causing widespread disruptions or at least inconvenience to the visitors. They might also launch disinformation campaigns aimed at sowing panic and confusion among the public and participants. The high-profile nature of the Olympics makes it an attractive target for such groups, who seek to exploit global attention for propaganda and to undermine the credibility of the host nation.
While hacktivists usually lack the resources to attack critical infrastructure, they are well capable of defacing official websites and social media pages, posting propaganda messages, threats, or inflammatory content to tarnish the reputation of the Games and spread their ideology to a broad audience. They can also employ DDoS attacks to overwhelm servers hosting ticket sales, event scheduling, and live streaming services, rendering them inaccessible to the public and causing significant disruptions. Hacktivists could also deploy ransomware to encrypt essential data and render some services inaccessible, creating a crisis situation during the Games.
These activities not only threaten the smooth operation of the Olympic Games but also aim to generate global media coverage, amplify the hacktivists’ message, and challenge the security and preparedness of the host nation. Comprehensive cybersecurity measures and international cooperation are vital to mitigate these risks and protect the integrity of the event. With the Olympic Games opening ceremony less than three weeks away on July 26th, we can only expect Russian Olympics-focused malign activity to intensify.
