HEALTHCARE – Quarterly Threat Landscape : Q3 2026

Published On : 2026-11-16
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HEALTHCARE – Quarterly Threat Landscape : Q3 2026

LANDSCAPE · SECTOR LENS

HEALTHCARE – Quarterly Threat Landscape : Q3 2026

1 July to 30 September 2026, compared with Q2 2026
2026 to date through 31 October · issued 16 November 2026

RANSOMWARE
7.8 HIGH
266 victims
▲ +27% vs Q2
Q4: rising
PHISHING
7.1 HIGH
17 research reports
▲ share +41% vs Q2 low data
Q4: stable
STATE ACTORS
6.2 HIGH
9.5% of campaigns
▲ +13% vs Q2
Q4: rising
VULNERABILITIES
2.9 Low
57 health CVEs
▼ share −52% vs Q2
Q4: rising
DARK WEB CHATTER
4.3 MODERATE
682 posts
▼ share −20% vs Q2
Q4: stable
MALWARE
5.7 MODERATE
32 reports
▲ share +11% vs Q2
Q4: stable

Written for healthcare CISOs and security leaders · hospitals and health systems, clinics, senior care, pharma and biotech, device makers, laboratories and payers

OVERVIEW

Healthcare’s busiest ransomware quarter on record, and October was busier still

KEY JUDGMENTS

  • Ransomware hit a record. 266 healthcare victims (+27% on Q2, +105% on a year ago). The sector’s share stayed at 9.1%, so it rose with the market rather than ahead of it. 30% of victims came from groups that first posted after 1 April.
  • October was the highest month on record. 121 healthcare victims in a single month, against 89 a month in Q3 and a previous peak of 118.
  • Care providers and their suppliers are both in the frame. Medical device and supply makers (40 victims), specialist medicine, pharma and hospitals lead; senior and long-term care nearly doubled.
  • The edge and remote access are the front door. VPN and firewall flaws and exposed remote services are the most reported ways in for the leading groups. CISA added 94 exploited flaws to its catalogue (+42%) and 32 more in October.
  • Clinical systems sit on the internet. 7,194 medical-imaging (DICOM) servers answer in 122 countries (monthly count up a third since January 2025), and 47 of 57 health-software CVEs in Q3 were rated critical or high.
  • State actors name healthcare in 9.5% of active campaigns, rising to 14% in October; espionage dominates, led by China- and Russia-linked groups.

Q3 IN NUMBERS

266
RANSOMWARE VICTIMS
17
PHISHING REPORTS
19
STATE CAMPAIGNS
57
HEALTH-SOFTWARE CVES
137
LEAK POSTS
32
MALWARE REPORTS

SECTION RISK AND OUTLOOK

Phishing scored on 17 research reports only: the URL feeds carry no healthcare-labelled URLs (section 04). The vulnerability score is low because total CVE volume rose 79%, not because exposure fell (section 05).

  • Does this affect me? Yes, if you hold patient data or run clinical systems. Every sub-sector from hospitals to dental practices, senior care and device makers appears on leak sites; the United States takes 64% of victims.
  • How exposed am I? Through internet-facing gateways and remote-access tools, backup and hypervisor platforms, and imaging, record and interoperability servers (DICOM, FHIR, EHR) that were not designed to be public.
  • What should I do now? Patch edge devices within days, take imaging and record servers off the internet, protect backups and hypervisors, and plan clinical downtime before an incident forces it.
OVERVIEW · 2026 SO FAR

How Q3 compares with the rest of 2026

Each panel shows the same measure for Q3 2025, the first three quarters of 2026 and October. Counts are used where collection was steady; shares of the whole dataset are used where collection changed (state actor reporting, CVE volumes, underground and research feeds). The dashed outline on October shows the quarter it would make at the same pace.

THE YEAR IN ONE PARAGRAPH

Ransomware against healthcare rose every quarter of 2026 (167, 210, 266) and is already +74% ahead of the same months of 2025. State-actor interest was highest in Q1, dipped in Q2 and partly recovered in Q3 before jumping in October. Health-software vulnerabilities peaked in Q1 (134) and settled near 57 a quarter, while underground chatter about the sector shrank with the collection itself.

WHAT OCTOBER TELLS US ABOUT Q4

October’s 121 healthcare ransomware victims are 36% above the Q3 monthly pace and the highest month we hold. Healthcare’s share of active state-actor campaigns rose to 14%, and 39 health-software CVEs appeared in one month, double the Q3 pace. Malware and phishing research held steady.

HEALTHCARE RANSOMWARE VICTIMS PER MONTH, 2025 TO OCTOBER 2026

RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION

Healthcare leak-site victims hit a record, and October went higher

266
HEALTHCARE VICTIMS IN Q3
+27% vs Q2 (210) · +105% vs Q3 2025
91%
OF ALL RANSOMWARE VICTIMS
Q2 9.1%: healthcare grew with the market, not faster
30%
FROM GROUPS NEW SINCE APRIL
81 victims · was 20% in Q2
764
VICTIMS IN 2026 TO DATE
Jan to Oct · +74% vs same months of 2025

HEALTHCARE VICTIMS PER MONTH

WHAT HAPPENED

Ransomware groups named 266 healthcare organisations on leak sites in Q3, up from 210 in Q2 and 167 in Q1. August alone posted 118, and every month of Q3 beat every month of 2025.

Healthcare rose with the market, not ahead of it: all sectors grew +26% and healthcare +27%, so its share held at 9.1%. That share makes it the fifth most-listed sector on leak sites.

The quarter was fed by new and small groups: 60 different groups listed healthcare victims (55 in Q2), and 30% of victims came from groups that first posted after 1 April.

OCTOBER SIGNAL

October posted 121 healthcare victims, 36% above the Q3 pace of 89 a month and above any earlier month (118). All-sector victims also hit a record 1,184, and healthcare’s share rose to 10.2%.

WHERE VICTIMS ARE

Right: healthcare share of each region’s Q3 victims (worldwide 9.1%). The United States alone accounts for 170 of 266, and North America grew from 125 to 175 while Europe held at about 30. Southeast Asia and Oceania more than doubled from small bases. Africa (4) is not charted.

Suppliers are targets too. Medical equipment and supply firms are the most-listed sub-sector (40 victims), ahead of hospitals (29). Senior and long-term care rose from 12 to 23.

HEALTHCARE SPECIALISTS

groups where healthcare is at least twice the worldwide share (9.1%) of their Q3 victims

RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION · CONTINUED

Who is hitting healthcare, and how they get in

MOST ACTIVE GROUPS AGAINST HEALTHCARE

Right: share of the group’s own Q3 victims that are healthcare. NEW = first leak-site post after 1 April 2026.

HOW THE LEADING GROUPS GET IN

reports, top 8 groups

WHICH PARTS OF HEALTHCARE

Q3 victims · change vs Q2

KNOWN EXPLOITED FLAWS REPORTED FOR THESE GROUPS

CVE Product (CISA KEV) Group Last Reported
CVE-2026-50751 Check Point Security Gateway Qilin 2026-10
CVE-2026-35273 Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools ShinyHunters 2026-09
CVE-2024-55591 Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Qilin, The Gentlemen 2026-05
CVE-2023-27532 Veeam Backup & Replication Qilin, The Gentlemen 2026-03
CVE-2025-32463 Sudo The Gentlemen 2026-03
CVE-2024-37085 VMware ESXi The Gentlemen 2026-03
CVE-2024-21762 Fortinet FortiOS Qilin 2025-09

Qilin was reported in October using a Check Point Security Gateway flaw (CVE-2026-50751, KEV with known ransomware use). Qilin is a ransomware-as-a-service group; the North Korean group Moonstone Sleet has been reported using it, which does not make Qilin state-run.

▲
Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
RISING
October set a record 121 victims

If October’s pace holds, Q4 ends near 363 healthcare victims, well above Q3. Two things could keep it there: new groups such as Krybit, Storm, CRPxO and Direwolf that already put healthcare above the worldwide share, and the established The Gentlemen, Qilin and INC Ransom (65 victims in Q3).

WHAT TO DO NOW

  1. Patch the edge first. VPN, firewall and remote services lead the access reports.
  2. Protect backups and hypervisors. Veeam and ESXi flaws recur across the leading groups.
  3. Watch new groups. 30% of Q3 victims came from groups that first posted after 1 April.

Risk score 7.8 = 35% momentum (healthcare leak-site victims, Q3 vs Q2 +27%, scored 7.1) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 1.41x, scored 7.5) + 30% impact weight (9 of 10). Measured as a count. Victims are organisations named on leak sites, dated by post date (not attack date), from CYFIRMA’s curated ransomware log; Q3 classification confidence: 188 high, 76 medium, 2 low.

RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION · BY SECTOR

Care providers and their suppliers rise together; senior care nearly doubles

33
Hospitals & health systems
+32% vs Q2
113
Clinics & specialist care
+23% vs Q2
23
Senior & long-term care
+92% vs Q2
32
Pharma & biotech
+10% vs Q2
40
Medical devices & supplies
+25% vs Q2
113
Labs & diagnostics
+17% vs Q2
11
Payers & administration
+38% vs Q2

HEALTHCARE SUB-SECTORS IN DETAIL

sparkline: monthly victims Jan to Oct 2026, Q3 shaded

New groups = share of the sub-sector’s Q3 victims posted by groups first seen after 1 April 2026. 2026 = January to October. Counts under 10 are indicative only. Two sub-sectors with fewer than 5 Q3 victims are left out (emergency medical services, alternative and holistic health).

  • Device and supply makers are the most-listed sub-sector. 40 victims in Q3 (+25%), led by ShinyHunters (8), DragonForce (4). Hospitals depend on their supplies and software.
  • Senior and long-term care nearly doubled. From 12 to 23 victims, with 4 of 23 from groups new since April. Dense health records, thin security teams.
  • Clinics and specialist practices are the long tail. 113 victims across primary care, specialised medicine, dental, eye care and mental health, led by INC Ransom (11), The Gentlemen (8). Specialised medicine and primary care rose.
  • Hospitals rose 32%. 25 to 33 victims, including emergency services. Payers and administrators (11) and laboratories (14) are smaller but hold the most concentrated data.
RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION · GEOGRAPHY

The United States carries nearly two-thirds of the load

COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST HEALTHCARE VICTIMS

over-representation = healthcare share of the country’s victims ÷ worldwide share (9.1%)

Over-representation shown only where a country posted at least 30 victims of all sectors and 3 healthcare victims in Q3. Above 1.5x (red) healthcare is hit noticeably more often than elsewhere.

REGION BY HEALTHCARE SEGMENT, Q3

LEADING GROUPS IN EACH REGION, Q3

N. AMERICA
The Gentlemen 17 · INC Ransom 12 · Qilin 12

EUROPE
ShinyHunters 5 · Qilin 4 · The Gentlemen 4

LATIN AMERICA
Kazu 2 · Krybit 2 · LockBit 5.0 2

MIDDLE EAST
Black X 1 · Blackwater 1 · Deadlock 1

AFRICA
Krybit 2 · INC Ransom 1 · Orova 1

SOUTH ASIA
Krybit 5 · Global Secret Group 1 · Kazu 1

EAST ASIA
The Gentlemen 3 · Qilin 2 · CRPxO 1 SE ASIA Krybit 2 · Qilin 2 · Coinbase Cartel 1

OCEANIA
INC Ransom 2 · ZaWoo 2 · MedusaLocker 1

The United States had 170 of 266 healthcare victims (64%), against 39% of all-sector victims there, so healthcare is hit more than average in the US and less in Europe. China and Turkey show a high healthcare share on small numbers.

RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION · HOW THEY OPERATE

MITRE ATT&CK: in through the edge, out with the backups

Techniques, tools and access methods reported for the groups that hit healthcare in Q3, weighted by each group’s healthcare victims. Profiles cover 13 of 60 groups (111 of 266 victims, 42%); most small new groups have none yet.

TOP TECHNIQUES PER ATT&CK TACTIC

healthcare victims of groups known to use the technique

HOW THEY GET IN

victims · groups

TOOLS THEY USE

healthcare victims of groups using the tool

FAMILY TIES

Qilin is reported partnering with DragonForce and LockBit 3.0; The Gentlemen are reported to have split from Qilin (a lead for analyst review, not attribution).

LockBit 5.0 continues the LockBit 3.0 family; Lynx is reported as derived from INC Ransom.

What the pattern says. Backup and shadow-copy deletion (vssadmin, bcdedit) appears for groups behind 59 healthcare victims, and ESXi tools (esxcli, vmkfstools) for groups behind 52. Remote-access software (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect) and PsExec are the most common ways to move once inside.

STATE & ORGANISED ACTORS

Espionage dominates state interest in healthcare, and October ran hotter

19
CAMPAIGNS ACTIVE AGAINST HEALTHCARE
9.5% of all active campaigns (Q2 8.4%, October 14.2%)
11
ESPIONAGE CAMPAIGNS
of 19 in Q3 · 20 in 2026 so far
8·5·4
CHINA · RUSSIA · N. KOREA
campaigns by origin in Q3; 94% of attributed activity
4
NEW CAMPAIGNS SINCE JULY
first seen Jul to Oct; two Russia-linked, one China- and one North Korea-linked

WHO IS BEHIND IT

WHERE HEALTHCARE CAMPAIGNS AIM

WHY THEY TARGET HEALTHCARE

MOST-USED TECHNIQUES IN HEALTHCARE CAMPAIGNS

Only 18 of 38 campaigns active in 2026 carry technique detail, so counts are small. Exploiting public-facing applications leads.

Patient, research and policy data. Espionage is the stated aim of most campaigns that name healthcare: pharma and biotech research, hospital networks and government health bodies. Theft and sabotage are rare in this sector’s campaign record, with one Russian-aligned sabotage campaign starting on 11 October.

NEW CAMPAIGNS NAMING HEALTHCARE, JULY TO OCTOBER

▲
Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
RISING
October share 14%, a 2026 high

Healthcare was named in 14% of campaigns active in October, the highest share this year, even as total campaign counts fell with late reporting. Expect China- and Russia-linked espionage against pharma, research and hospital networks to continue, with exploitation of internet-facing applications as the main entry. Totals for recent months will rise as late reports arrive.

Risk score 6.2 = 35% momentum (healthcare share of active campaigns, Q3 vs Q2 +13%, scored 6.0) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 1.00x, scored 5.0) + 30% impact weight (8 of 10). Measured as a share. Campaigns count when active in the quarter. APT reporting is delayed by nature, so recent counts are incomplete; shares are compared. Healthcare is named in few campaigns (19 in Q3), so small changes move the share. 79% of Q3 healthcare campaigns come from CYFIRMA early-warning collection.

STATE & ORGANISED ACTORS · GEOGRAPHY

Japan, the United States, India and Australia are named most often

COUNTRIES NAMED IN HEALTHCARE CAMPAIGNS

MOST ACTIVE ACTORS AGAINST HEALTHCARE IN 2026

Campaigns active in the period. Lazarus Group and Cozy Bear are linked to 3 healthcare campaigns each in 2026, the most of any actor; no actor stands out, which fits a sector targeted opportunistically for data rather than by specialists.

WHO TARGETS WHICH REGION, Q3

A campaign that names several regions counts once in each. CYFIRMA early-warning campaigns name about six countries each, which lifts Asia-Pacific counts.

STATE & ORGANISED ACTORS · HOW THEY OPERATE

MITRE ATT&CK: public-facing flaws, web shells and password spraying

Techniques reported for healthcare campaigns active in 2026 (18 of 38 campaigns have technique detail). Counts are campaigns using the technique.

TOP TECHNIQUES PER ATT&CK TACTIC

healthcare victims of groups known to use the technique

MALWARE AND TOOLS IN HEALTHCARE CAMPAIGNS

campaigns, 2026

FLAWS EXPLOITED IN THESE CAMPAIGNS

campaigns, 2026

Offensive security tools are everywhere. Cobalt Strike, Impacket, Nuclei, Ffuf and Patator appear alongside custom command-and-control. One October China-linked campaign used the open-source ARTEX AI attack agent against targets in Belgium, the United States and the Philippines.

WHAT TO HUNT FOR

  • Exploitation of VPN, remote-support and file-transfer gateways (Citrix, Fortinet, Ivanti, BeyondTrust).
  • Web shells (T1505.003) on public-facing servers and password spraying (T1110.003) against remote access.
  • Rename-and-reuse of legitimate utilities and DLL side-loading to blend in.
PHISHING & SOCIAL ENGINEERING

Phishing evidence for healthcare is thin

17
RESEARCH REPORTS NAMING HEALTHCARE
+55% vs Q2 (11) · 5 in October
10.6%
OF ALL PHISHING RESEARCH
Q2 7.5% · Q1 10.7% · October 9.4%
0 of 326k
PHISHING URLS LABELLED HEALTHCARE
URL feeds, January to November 2026
57
VICTIMS OF GROUPS USING PHISHING EMAIL
reported route for 5 groups; stolen credentials 57

PHISHING RESEARCH REPORTS PER MONTH, ALL SECTORS, WITH THE HEALTHCARE COUNT

WHAT THE DATA CAN AND CANNOT SAY

CYFIRMA’s phishing URL feeds classify each URL by the brand it imitates. Banks, telecoms, retailers, technology and logistics brands are in the lists; healthcare brands almost never are, so none of 326,071 URLs this year carries a healthcare label. That absence is a limit of the method, not evidence that healthcare is not phished.

The only phishing signal that names the sector is public threat-sharing research: 17 reports in Q3, 10.6% of 161 phishing reports, up from 11 in Q2. The numbers are small, so the Q2 to Q3 rise (+55%) is a hint, not a trend.

WHAT OTHER EVIDENCE SHOWS

Phishing and stolen credentials each appear as a reported way in for groups behind 57 and 57 healthcare ransomware victims in Q3, close behind VPN and firewall flaws (80). Staff credential phishing, rather than brand-impersonation kits, is the likelier form in this sector.

Score confidence is low. The phishing risk score rests on research-report counts alone. Treat it as an indication until a healthcare brand and portal watchlist feeds the URL data.

→
Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
STABLE
Thin evidence: research reports only

Expect phishing to stay a steady entry route rather than a rising one. Without sector-labelled URLs the quarter-on-quarter change cannot be measured reliably; October’s five reports are in line with the Q3 monthly pace of about six.

WHAT TO DO NOW

  1. Treat staff credential phishing and help-desk social engineering as an initial-access risk, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA for remote access and email.
  2. Watch for look-alike domains of your own hospital, patient-portal and appointment-app brands (DeCYFIR and DeTCT monitor brand abuse).
  3. Brief reception, help-desk and billing staff on voice and text lures that pose as clinicians, suppliers or insurers.

Risk score 7.1 = 35% momentum (healthcare share of phishing research, Q3 vs Q2 +41%, scored 8.3) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 1.16x, scored 6.0) + 30% impact weight (7 of 10). Measured as a share. Counted from public threat-sharing research pulses that discuss phishing and carry a healthcare tag; the URL feeds contribute no healthcare data.

VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURE

Fewer new health-software flaws, but most are serious

57
HEALTH-SOFTWARE CVES IN Q3
−15% vs Q2 (67) · Q1 134 · October 39
47
RATED CRITICAL OR HIGH
82% of the quarter’s healthcare CVEs (Q2 46)
94
FLAWS ADDED TO CISA KEV
+42% vs Q2; 6 with known ransomware use
10 → 5 days
CVE TO CONFIRMED EXPLOITATION
median, all KEV flaws · 49 of 94 within a week

HEALTH-SOFTWARE CVES BY TYPE OF SYSTEM

published CVEs per quarter · October ghosted

MOST-AFFECTED HEALTH SOFTWARE, JUL TO OCT

Sector tags come from product and vendor names, so a few false matches are possible; one Oracle database tool matched on the word “health” and is removed.

READING THE NUMBERS

  • One product swings the count. OpenEMR alone is 74 of Q1’s 134 healthcare CVEs and 86 of 297 so far in 2026, so quarterly totals follow its disclosure batches.
  • The score is low for a statistical reason. Healthcare’s share of all new CVEs fell from 0.32% to 0.15% because total CVE volume rose 79% quarter on quarter. The absolute count and severity matter more here.
  • Records, FHIR and imaging systems dominate. Records and FHIR systems rose from 12 to 39 CVEs, while imaging and laboratory flaws eased.
  • Medical devices went quiet after 18 in Q2; none were tagged in Q3.

Open-source health platforms are the pattern. MONAI, OpenEMR, dcm4che, HAPI FHIR and DHIS2 are community projects that hospitals and health ministries run themselves. Patching depends on the operator, not a vendor service.

▲
Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
RISING
October 39 CVEs vs 19 a month in Q3

October already counts 39 health-software CVEs, twice the Q3 monthly pace, and the wider flow of exploited flaws keeps accelerating: CVE-to-exploitation time halved to 5 days. The more important Q4 question is exposure, covered on the next page.

WHAT TO DO NOW

  1. Inventory the open-source clinical platforms you run and assign an owner to each.
  2. Subscribe to advisories for OpenEMR, dcm4che, Orthanc, HAPI FHIR and DHIS2 and patch critical items within days.
  3. Restrict administration interfaces of clinical systems to internal networks or VPN.

Risk score 2.9 = 35% momentum (healthcare share of new CVEs, Q3 vs Q2 −52%, scored 0.8) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 0.26x, scored 0.5) + 30% impact weight (8 of 10). Measured as a share. Healthcare CVEs are tagged by CYFIRMA from vendor and product names (high-confidence tags only). CISA KEV figures cover all sectors.

VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURE · INTERNET FOOTPRINT

Imaging and record servers on the open internet keep growing

A snapshot of internet-facing systems that identify themselves as clinical or healthcare-named, from CYFIRMA internet exposure monitoring (single snapshot, 2026-11-12; aggregate counts only). Detection is by banner, page title and organisation name, so the counts are a floor, and sums across rows overlap.

CLINICAL SYSTEMS ANSWERING ON THE INTERNET

System Hosts Countries With KEV Flaw
DICOM imaging servers 7,194 122 ·
OHIF imaging viewers 850 54 ·
FHIR servers 232 35 ·
Orthanc imaging servers 114 28 ·
OpenMRS record systems 95 21 1
DHIS2 health information 94 28 ·

MONTHLY EXPOSURE, JAN 2025 TO OCT 2026

Hosts

DICOM servers rose from 5,113 to 6,758 (+32%); clinic-named hosts rose by half; hospital-named hosts fell by about a third (35k to 25k); the grey line is NHS-named hosts.

HEALTHCARE-NAMED HOSTS

Signal Hosts Countries With KEV Flaw
.health domains 50,337 113 34
Hosts of organisations named hospital 13,050 59 7
.nhs hostnames 9,551 45 1
Organisations named healthcare 8,624 36 3
Organisations named laboratories 7,837 27 11
Organisations named medical center 6,019 15 9
.hospital domains 4,447 78 2
Organisations named clinic 3,575 27 1

WHERE DICOM SERVERS SIT

Country Hosts
United States 2,044
Germany 605
India 441
Taiwan 409
Brazil 366
United Kingdom 226
China 214

DICOM was not designed for the open internet. The protocol carries patient studies with little authentication. 7,194 servers in 122 countries answer; the United States, Germany, India, Taiwan and Brazil hold the most.

KNOWN EXPLOITED FLAWS ON HEALTHCARE-NAMED HOSTS

hosts of organisations whose name or domain marks them as healthcare

Product Healthcare-Named Hosts Internet-Wide Hosts Ransomware Use
WordPress Core 15 91,718 ·
PHP 11 154,266 yes
Microsoft SharePoint 7 17,910 yes
MongoDB Server 4 37,212 ·
Citrix NetScaler Gateway 3 831 ·
Citrix NetScaler 3 777 ·
Drupal Core 2 1,323 ·
MikroTik RouterOS 1 134,438 ·

Exploited flaws (CISA KEV) tagged on 46 healthcare-named hosts, led by web platforms (WordPress, PHP) and Microsoft SharePoint. The healthcare-named count is small because the name match is narrow; the internet-wide count shows how widely each product is installed.

VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURE · NEWLY EXPLOITED IN OCTOBER

October added 32 exploited flaws, most on the edge and in remote access

October 2026 flaws added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, grouped by product. These are not healthcare-specific: the same products run in hospitals, clinics and pharma. Flaws in edge, remote-support, backup and hypervisor products are the entry points that ransomware groups use against healthcare (section 02).

Product CVEs Added CVSS EPSS Underground Posts State Campaigns Ransomware Links Healthcare-Named Hosts
Ivanti Connect Secure 3 10/13 8.6 89% 3 1 · ·
Ahsay AhsayCBS 2 10/14 10.0 84% · · · ·
PHP 2 10/26 9.2 100% 28 · · ·
Adobe Commerce and Magento 1 10/27 9.3 47% 1 · · ·
Atlassian multiple products 1 10/15 9.3 100% 2 · · 2
BeyondTrust Remote Support 1 10/16 9.3 79% · 1 · ·
Broadcom VMware ESXi 1 10/28 2.7 1% · · · ·
Cisco Secure Email Gateway 1 10/14 9.8 6% 1 · · ·
Cisco Secure Firewall ASA 1 10/29 8.6 1% · · · ·
Citrix NetScaler 1 10/04 8.7 11% · · · 6
Fortinet FortiMail 1 10/01 9.8 5% 2 · · ·
Fortinet multiple products 1 10/16 5.4 1% · 1 · ·
Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS 1 10/14 8.6 2% · · · ·

EPSS = modelled probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Underground posts, state campaigns and ransomware links: most mentions for any flaw of the product in CYFIRMA data; ‘·’ means none yet, as link tables lag by months. Healthcare-named hosts: name match on known-exploited flaws, a floor.

PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and -109619), CVSS 9.2. Published 21 October, added to KEV five days later. 805 exploit repositories on GitHub from 18 October, 29 underground posts across 8 channels from 20 to 29 October. PHP runs patient portals, WordPress sites and many clinical web front ends; version banners suggest up to 1.6 million PHP hosts internet-wide (an upper bound); a healthcare-named count is not available for this flaw.

Edge and remote access again. 10 of October’s flaws are in Ivanti, Citrix, Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet, Cisco and BeyondTrust products, plus AhsayCBS backup and VMware ESXi. These are the products that appear in healthcare ransomware access reports, and the two Ivanti Connect Secure flaws added on 30 October need first attention.

UNDERGROUND & DARK WEB CHATTER

Chatter about healthcare shrinks with the collection, but victim posts grow

682
POSTS NAMING HEALTHCARE IN Q3
−24% vs Q2 (901) · October 259
3.06%
OF ALL UNDERGROUND POSTS
Q2 3.85% · Q1 3.65% · October 3.65%
137
RANSOMWARE VICTIM POSTS
+44% vs Q2 (95) · 71 in October
51 of 117
CHANNELS MENTIONING HEALTHCARE
Q2 74 of 168; monitored channels fell by almost a third

HEALTHCARE SHARE OF UNDERGROUND POSTS PER MONTH

WHAT IS BEING POSTED

Posts per category; a post can carry several. Posts with no country are not shown below.

COUNTRIES NAMED WITH HEALTHCARE

Shares, not totals. All-sector posts fell from 82,757 in Q3 2025 to 22,270 in Q3 2026 as the monitored channel set shrank, so the healthcare count falls with it. Israel-tagged healthcare posts dropped from 70 to 15 after a busy Q2.

→
Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
STABLE
Collection shrinking; victim posts up

Leak-site victim posts, the most actionable category, rose 44% and reached 71 in October alone, matching the ransomware record. Expect victim posts to keep rising, while general chatter stays flat as collection stays narrow. Underground discussion of PHP2Shell (29 posts in ten days across the whole dataset) shows how quickly new flaws are traded.

Risk score 4.3 = 35% momentum (healthcare share of underground posts, Q3 vs Q2 −20%, scored 3.4) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 0.82x, scored 3.9) + 30% impact weight (6 of 10). Measured as a share. Posts are unique underground and dark web messages with a healthcare tag, after removing junk. Collection of the whole dataset fell during 2026, so shares are compared.

MALWARE INTELLIGENCE

Remote-access trojans and proxy tools lead healthcare reporting

32
RESEARCH REPORTS NAMING HEALTHCARE
+14% vs Q2 (28)
7.4%
OF ALL MALWARE REPORTS
Q2 6.6% · October 7.3%
PlugX
MOST-NAMED FAMILY
4 reports in Q3 after none in Q2 · China-linked remote-access trojan
Lurk tools
NEW IN Q3 REPORTING
OctLurk, LurkProxy and SilkLurk each named in two reports, none in Q2

MALWARE NAMED IN HEALTHCARE REPORTS

Public research reports tagged healthcare, by malware named. A report can name several families; counts are small.

STEALERS IN IOC FEEDS

share of new indicators, all sectors

Indicator collection changed between Q2 and Q3, so shares are compared. Credential stealers feed account takeover and initial access for ransomware; they are not specific to healthcare.

HOW THE MALWARE WORKS

techniques in Q3 healthcare reports

Why this matters for healthcare. Remote-access trojans (PlugX, ValleyRAT, AsyncRAT) and command-and-control frameworks (AdaptixC2) give long-term access to clinical and research networks, the pattern state-linked espionage uses. Stealers collect the staff credentials that ransomware groups report as a top way in.

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Q4 2026 OUTLOOK
STABLE
Reports steady at about 30 a quarter

Healthcare’s share of malware reporting is steady at about 7%. Expect remote-access trojans and proxy tooling to keep appearing in espionage-linked reports, and stealer families to keep rotating.

WHAT TO DO NOW

  1. Hunt for stealer infections on staff devices and revoke exposed sessions and tokens quickly.
  2. Block unapproved remote-management tools; AnyDesk and ScreenConnect recur in ransomware intrusions.
  3. Segment research and clinical networks so a trojan on an office PC cannot reach them.

Risk score 5.7 = 35% momentum (healthcare share of malware reports, Q3 vs Q2 +11%, scored 5.9) + 35% level (Q3 vs the Q1 to Q2 average, 1.04x, scored 5.2) + 30% impact weight (6 of 10). Measured as a share. Research reports are public threat-sharing pulses tagged with the healthcare sector; IOC figures are new indicators from malware feeds, capped per family and week.

MALWARE INTELLIGENCE · GEOGRAPHY AND ATT&CK

Healthcare malware hides well, talks over the web and proxies traffic

TOP TECHNIQUES PER ATT&CK TACTIC

healthcare research reports, Q3

COUNTRIES NAMED IN HEALTHCARE MALWARE REPORTS

ATTACK INFRASTRUCTURE SEEN ONLINE

C2 servers, snapshot

Command-and-control servers identified by banner, all sectors. AdaptixC2, named in three Q3 healthcare reports, has 70 live servers.

PLATFORMS

reports naming malware for each platform

Many reports do not state a platform; Windows dominates where one is named. Linux malware appears in three Q3 reports after none in Q2.

SHARED WITH STATE ACTORS

actors reported using the family

Families seen in healthcare reports this quarter that state actors also use, so a hit can mean either crime or espionage.

COMPARISON · SUB-SECTORS

Clinics, device makers and hospitals carry most of the load; senior care is rising fastest

Healthcare sub-sectors grouped into seven segments, Q3 2026 with the change from Q2. Sub-sector detail exists for ransomware, state campaigns and CVEs; underground posts, phishing research and malware reports name the sector but rarely the sub-sector. A campaign or CVE can cover several segments.

State campaigns: 8 further campaigns name healthcare without a sub-sector. Veterinary services sit in clinics. Internet hosts: single snapshot of named hosts, available for three segments only (hospital and NHS names, clinic, dental and medical-group names, laboratory and imaging systems).

COMPARISON · REGIONS

How the threat to healthcare differs by region

Healthcare-related activity per region in Q3 2026 across four datasets, with the change from Q2 where the base is large enough. Colour depth is relative within each column. A campaign, post or report can name several regions. Phishing is left out because the URL feeds carry no healthcare label.

North America
Most ransomware victims (175, +40%) and the second-most underground chatter. Healthcare is 14% of the region’s leak-site victims, above the worldwide share.

East and South Asia
East Asia has the most state campaigns of any region (13, South Asia 8), with Japan, India and South Korea named most; leak-site victims stay low (12 and 9).

Europe
Flat ransomware (31 to 30) and a low healthcare share (4% of victims). German, Russian and Italian underground posts dominate chatter; state campaigns name Germany, the UK and France.

Southeast Asia and Oceania
Ransomware grew from small bases (4 to 10 in Southeast Asia, 3 to 7 in Oceania), alongside steady state interest in Australia, Singapore and the Philippines.

Latin America
Ransomware eased (17 to 11), but underground posts naming Brazil rose from 4 to 18.

Middle East and Africa
Small numbers. Underground posts naming Israel fell from 70 to 15; Morocco and Egypt lead African mentions.

COMPARISON · TOP COUNTRIES

Which countries lead each region, dataset by dataset

The three countries with the most healthcare-related activity in each region in Q3 2026: ransomware victims, state campaigns naming the country, and underground posts naming the country with healthcare.

WHAT STANDS OUT

  • The United States leads every dataset in North America and holds 170 of 266 healthcare ransomware victims.
  • Japan (12), the United States (11), India and Australia (8 each) are the countries state campaigns name most, yet Japan and India post few leak-site victims.
  • Germany leads Europe for ransomware victims and underground posts, while Russia and Italy follow on chatter.

READ WITH CARE

  • State campaigns often list many countries; CYFIRMA early-warning campaigns name about six each, which lifts Asia-Pacific counts.
  • Underground posts without a country (313 in Q3) are not shown.
  • Counts under 10 are indicative only.
REGULATION & COMPLIANCE

Rules are moving toward supplier security and fast reporting, but the biggest US rewrite has slipped

The regulatory picture for healthcare split in Q3. In the EU, the Cyber Resilience Act turned on its reporting duties for product makers on 11 September, the Health Data Space is being phased in, and NIS2 already covers hospitals and pharma. In the US, HHS pushed its HIPAA Security Rule rewrite out to mid-2027. The UK is legislating for supply-chain resilience, with the NHS in focus.

United States

Jan 2025 → Jul 2027

HIPAA Security Rule overhaul pushed back
HHS proposed mandatory MFA, encryption, asset inventories and 72-hour restoration in January 2025. The regulatory agenda now puts final action no earlier than July 2027, so the existing Security Rule stays in force.

In force

FDA cybersecurity rules for medical devices
Manufacturers of connected ‘cyber devices’ must give the FDA a vulnerability plan and a software bill of materials with premarket submissions (section 524B).

Pending

CIRCIA final rule still not published
Until CISA’s rule takes effect, the proposed 72-hour incident and 24-hour ransom-payment reports are not required (status as checked in November 2026).

European Union

11 Sep 2026

Cyber Resilience Act reporting duties start
Manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through ENISA’s platform: early warning in 24 hours, notification in 72 hours. Most other duties apply from 11 Dec 2027. Devices under the MDR and IVDR are largely outside the CRA; record systems, gateways and other software around them are not.

Mar 2025 →

European Health Data Space in force
Regulation (EU) 2025/327 applies in stages from 2027, with secondary-use rules from 2029; implementing acts are due by March 2027. It sets security and interoperability duties for electronic health record systems.

In force

NIS2 covers health
Hospitals, laboratories, pharma and critical-device makers are essential or important entities with 24-hour early warning and 72-hour incident reporting.

United Kingdom

Nov 2025 →

Cyber Security and Resilience Bill
Introduced to widen cyber regulation to more services and supply chains, with a focus on the NHS. In the Lords as of October 2026; not yet law.

Annual

NHS Data Security and Protection Toolkit
Mandatory self-assessment for organisations with access to NHS patient data, moved onto the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework from 2024. NHS England’s supplier charter expects suppliers to reach at least ‘Standards Met’.

REGULATION & COMPLIANCE · WHAT IT MEANS

Reporting clocks, supplier duties and clinical downtime

INCIDENT NOTIFICATION CLOCKS HEALTHCARE MUST MEET

Regime Deadline What
EU · NIS2 24h / 72h early warning, then incident notification, for essential and important entities
EU · Cyber Resilience Act 24h / 72h manufacturers: actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents (from 11 Sep 2026)
EU / UK · GDPR 72 hours personal data breaches to the supervisory authority
US · HIPAA breach rule 60 days notice to individuals and HHS after discovery of a breach of unsecured health information
Australia · Cyber Security Act 72 hours ransomware payments reported by covered businesses (in force since 30 May 2025)
US · SEC 4 business days material incidents of listed companies, including pharma and device makers (Form 8-K)
US · CIRCIA pending proposed 72 hours, ransom payments 24 hours

Simplified; scope, triggers and thresholds differ by rule and by country. A multinational group hit by ransomware may face several clocks, and the 24-hour ones, before triage is finished. HIPAA’s 60 days is an outer limit; HHS expects notice without unreasonable delay.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR HEALTHCARE CISOS

  • Do not wait for the HIPAA rewrite. MFA, encryption, asset inventories and tested restoration are what the proposal contains and what the access data in section 02 calls for.
  • Prove recovery, not just prevention. The proposed 72-hour restoration target matches the downtime ransomware creates; clinical downtime procedures need rehearsing.
  • Map supplier concentration. Device makers and suppliers are the most-listed ransomware sub-sector; ask them for CRA and SBOM evidence.
  • Know your clocks. Decide in advance who files which notice and who has authority to declare a reportable incident.

LINK TO THIS QUARTER’S THREATS

  • Device and supply makers posted 40 ransomware victims, more than hospitals; supplier duties are a direct response to that exposure.
  • Open-source records and imaging platforms (OpenEMR, dcm4che, HAPI FHIR) produce most health-software CVEs; CRA duties fall on commercial products built on such software rather than on volunteer projects.
  • 7,194 DICOM servers on the open internet may be a data-protection issue under GDPR and HIPAA as well as a security one.

Checked on 16 November 2026 against published sources: HHS HIPAA Security Rule notice of proposed rulemaking (6 January 2025) and the Unified Agenda entry reported by trade press (Fierce Healthcare, GovInfoSecurity); Cyber Resilience Act reporting guidance from law firms and national cyber agencies (11 September 2026); European Commission health data space pages and Regulation (EU) 2025/327; NHS England, UK Government and NHS Digital pages on the Data Security and Protection Toolkit and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill. FDA section 524B, NIS2, GDPR, HIPAA breach-notification, Australian and SEC items reflect the rules as generally applied and were not re-checked this quarter; confirm each entity’s scope. Regulation varies by country; a dedicated regulatory tracking dataset is recommended for future editions.

PRIORITIES & OUTLOOK

What to expect in Q4 2026, and what to do first

SECTOR OUTLOOK

We expect Q4 risk to rise. Ransomware against healthcare ended Q3 at a record and October went higher still (121 victims), while the wider flow of exploited flaws and edge-device attacks keeps accelerating. Healthcare’s share of state campaigns reached its 2026 high in October. The Q3 composite score of 5.7 understates this: the vulnerability score is held down by a sharp rise in total CVE volume, and phishing is scored on thin research data. Expect imaging and record servers on the internet to stay the largest avoidable exposure.

PRIORITIES FOR HEALTHCARE CISOS

P1 now · P2 this quarter · P3 next · number = report section

P1

02 · 05
Patch internet-facing gateways and remote access within days
VPN and firewall flaws (groups behind 80 victims) and exposed remote services (64) lead the access reports; October added Ivanti, Citrix, PAN-OS, Cisco ASA and BeyondTrust flaws.

P1

05
Take imaging and record servers off the open internet
7,194 DICOM servers answer publicly (12 Nov); the monthly count is up 32% since January 2025. Put DICOM, FHIR, OpenEMR and viewer interfaces behind VPN and authentication.

P1

02
Make backups and hypervisors ransomware-resilient
Backup deletion tools appear for groups behind 59 victims and ESXi tooling behind 52. Keep offline copies and test restores, including clinical systems.

P2

02 · 04
Lock down remote tools and stolen-credential routes
AnyDesk (groups behind 56 victims), ScreenConnect and PsExec are the common ways to move; stolen credentials (57) and phishing (57) are the reported ways in.

P2

02 · 09
Hold suppliers and device makers to account
Device and supply makers are the most-listed sub-sector (40 victims). Ask for SBOMs, patch SLAs and incident-notice terms.

P2

02
Track new ransomware groups
30% of Q3 healthcare victims came from groups new since April; senior-care and clinic victims rose fastest.

P3

09
Plan clinical downtime and notification
Rehearse paper-based care, diagnostics fallback and who files which regulatory notice; clocks run from 24 hours (NIS2, CRA) to 60 days (HIPAA).

P3

03
Protect research and trial data
Espionage is the main state motive; segment research networks, watch for web shells and password spraying, and review exposed remote-access gateways.

These priorities reflect the intelligence available at 31 October 2026 and are subject to each organisation’s own controls and monitoring.

METHOD & SOURCES

How this report was built

PERIODS
Last quarter = Q3 2026 (1 July to 30 September), compared with Q2 2026 (1 April to 30 June). Context: Q1 2026, Q3 2025 and October 2026. Data cut-off 31 October 2026; extracted 16 November 2026 from the CYFIRMA threat warehouse.

RISK SCORES
Each section score (0 to 10) = 35% momentum (Q3 vs Q2), 35% level (Q3 vs the average of Q1 and Q2) and 30% impact weight for the threat type. Momentum score = 5 + 8 x change; level score = 5 + 6 x (ratio − 1), both capped at 0 and 10. Counts are used for ransomware; shares of the whole dataset are used elsewhere. The overall score is the impact-weighted mean. Bands: 8 and above critical, 6 to 8 high, 4 to 6 moderate, below 4 low. The method matches the Finance edition so sectors can be compared.

Section Measure Impact Mom. Level Score
Ransomware healthcare leak-site victims 9 7.1 7.5 7.8
State share of active campaigns 8 6.0 5.0 6.2
Vulnerabilities share of new CVEs 8 0.8 0.5 2.9
Phishing share of phishing research 7 8.3 6.0 7.1
Underground share of underground posts 6 3.4 3.9 4.3
Malware intelligence share of malware reports 6 5.9 5.2 5.7

OUTLOOKS
Q4 outlooks are analyst judgments based on the October reading against the Q3 pace and on the qualitative evidence in each section.

DATA SOURCES

  • Ransomware: CYFIRMA’s curated ransomware leak-site log, group profiles and published reporting on access methods and CVEs.
  • State and organised actors: CYFIRMA early-warning campaigns plus public vendor and government reporting, merged into one campaign record.
  • Phishing: public threat-sharing research on phishing. The phishing URL feeds were checked but carry no healthcare-labelled URLs.
  • Vulnerabilities: CVE records with sector tagging, CISA KEV and CYFIRMA internet exposure monitoring (software-version and banner snapshot, aggregate counts only).
  • Underground & dark web chatter: CYFIRMA monitoring of underground forums, dark web sites and messaging channels.
  • Malware: public threat-sharing research pulses and malware indicator feeds.
  • Regulation: regulator and government publications, checked on 16 November 2026 (section 09).

READ WITH CARE

  • Leak-site posts are dated by post date, not attack date. Victim names are not published in this report.
  • APT reporting is delayed by nature: recent quarters will rise as reports arrive. 79% of Q3 healthcare campaigns come from CYFIRMA collection.
  • Underground and dark web collection shrank during 2026; compare shares, not totals.
  • Healthcare CVE tags come from vendor and product names; OpenEMR dominates the 2026 count, and one false keyword match was removed.
  • Exposure counts are snapshots matched by banner, title or organisation name; they are floors and are never added across signals.
  • Small numbers (under 10) are indicative only.