Self Assessment

Weekly Intelligence Report – 14 Feb 2025

Published On : 2025-02-13
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Weekly Intelligence Report – 14 Feb 2025

Ransomware of the Week

CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team would like to highlight ransomware trends and insights gathered while monitoring various forums. This includes multiple – industries, geography, and technology – which could be relevant to your organization.

Type: Ransomware
Target Technologies: MS Windows

Introduction
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team has found Core Ransomware while monitoring various underground forums as part of our Threat Discovery Process.

Core Ransomware
Researchers recently discovered Core ransomware, a new variant within the Makop ransomware family, which is designed to encrypt files and demand a ransom for decryption. Once executed, Core ransomware encrypts data and modifies filenames by appending a unique victim ID, the attackers’ email address, and the “.core” extension. After completing the encryption process, it changes the desktop wallpaper and generates a ransom note in a text file named “+README-WARNING+.txt”, instructing victims on how to recover their files.

Screenshot of files encrypted by this ransomware (Source: Surface Web)

The ransom note from Core ransomware informs the victim that their files have been both encrypted and stolen. It warns that any attempt to decrypt the files without the attackers’ assistance could make them permanently inaccessible, leading to irreversible data loss.

Screenshot of Core ransomware’s text file (“+README-WARNING+.txt”) (Source: Surface Web)

Screenshot of Core’s desktop wallpaper: (Source: Surface Web)

Following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework.

Tactic ID Technique
Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
Execution T1129 Shared Modules
Persistence T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
Persistence T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Privilege Escalation T1055 Process Injection
Privilege Escalation T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Defense Evasion T1014 Rootkit
Defense
Evasion
T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1055 Process Injection
Defense
Evasion
T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Defense
Evasion
T1202 Indirect Command Execution
Defense Evasion T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification
Defense Evasion T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Defense Evasion T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
Defense Evasion T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
Defense Evasion T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
Defense
Evasion
T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Discovery T1012 Query Registry
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1135 Network Share Discovery
Discovery T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Discovery T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Discovery T1614 System Location Discovery
Collection T1115 Clipboard Data
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Impact T1485 Data Destruction
Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
Impact T1496 Resource Hijacking

Relevancy and Insights:

  • This ransomware specifically targets the widely used Windows Operating System, which is prevalent across numerous industries and organizations.
  • The ransomware’s attempt to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) indicates a deliberate effort to hinder data recovery options for victims.
  • The ransomware is making calls to the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) framework. WMI is a powerful tool used by many legitimate applications and services, but it can also be exploited by malware to execute commands, collect information, or perform system modifications.

ETLM Assessment:
According to an assessment by CYFIRMA, Makop ransomware has been targeting industries such as software, IT, finance, and others on a global scale. This new variant is expected to continue focusing on these sectors due to their high financial value.

Cybercriminals are likely to exploit vulnerabilities within these industries to disrupt operations, steal sensitive data, and demand significant ransoms. This underscores the urgent need for strengthened defense mechanisms to safeguard these high-priority sectors from potential ransomware attacks.

Sigma Rule
title: Delete shadow copy via WMIC threatname:
behaviorgroup: 18
classification: 0 mitreattack:

logsource:
category: process_creation product: windows
detection: selection:

CommandLine:
– ‘*wmic*shadowcopy delete*’ condition: selection
level: critical

(Source: Surface web)

Indicators of Compromise
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise controls on your security systems.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Implement competent security protocols and encryption, authentication, or access credentials configurations to access critical systems in your cloud and local environments.
  • Ensure that backups of critical systems are maintained which can be used to restore data in case a need arises.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • A data breach prevention plan must be developed considering (a) the type of data being managed by the company; (b) the remediation process; (c) where and how the data is stored; (d) if there is an obligation to notify the local authority.
  • Enable zero-trust architecture and multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate the compromise of credentials.
  • Foster a culture of cybersecurity, where you encourage and invest in employee training so that security is an integral part of your organization.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
  • Add the Sigma rules for threat detection and monitoring which will help to detect anomalies in log events, identify and monitor suspicious activities.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.

Trending Malware of the Week

Type: Trojan
Objective: Web Traffic Manipulation, Unauthorized Redirection Suspected Threat Actor: DragonRank
Target Industries: Government, Universities, Technology, Telecommunications
Target Geographies: India, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Brazil, and Bangladesh
Target Technology: IIS servers

Active Malware of the Week
This week “BadIIS” is trending.

BadIIS
Researchers observed threat actors targeting IIS servers in Asia to deploy BadIIS malware as part of an SEO manipulation campaign. This malware enables attackers to inject malicious content, display unauthorized ads, distribute malware, and conduct watering hole attacks. The campaign appears financially motivated, as infected servers redirect users to illegal gambling sites. Researchers suspect that a Chinese-speaking threat group, known as DragonRank, is behind this activity. Through analysis of extracted domains and strings written in simplified Chinese found in malware samples, researchers believe these variants were likely created and deployed by Chinese-speaking groups. The attack has impacted multiple countries, including India, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Brazil, with Bangladesh also identified as a potential target.

Researchers also found that victims were not always in the same region as the infected servers. Some users were affected when they visited compromised servers in different locations. The compromised servers belong to government agencies, universities, tech firms, and telecommunications companies, highlighting the widespread risk posed by this campaign.

Attack method
While the initial access method remains unclear, attackers may have exploited vulnerabilities or used zero-day flaws to compromise IIS servers. Once inside, attackers deployed batch files to install BadIIS modules, embedding the malware within the system. These scripts automated the deployment, ensuring persistent access and control over the infected servers.

Fig: One of the scripts used for IIS module installation

SEO Manipulation mode
BadIIS operates in multiple modes, one of which focuses on manipulating search engine traffic. Once installed, BadIIS manipulates web traffic by modifying HTTP response headers. It examines incoming requests, specifically looking at the User-Agent and Referer fields. If these fields contain certain search engine sites or keywords, the malware redirects users to illegal gambling pages instead of the intended website. This technique allows attackers to manipulate search results and divert traffic for financial gain.

Fig: Workflow of SEO Manipulation mode

Injector mode
Another method used by BadIIS is injector mode, where the malware injects suspicious JavaScript into responses for legitimate visitors, causing them to be redirected to malicious websites. The malware also encrypts its command-and-control (C&C) URL using a simple XOR key, which is decrypted during execution to evade detection.

Fig: Workflow of injector mode

INSIGHTS

  • BadIIS represents a growing trend in cyber threats where financially motivated actors exploit widely used web infrastructure for profit-driven campaigns. Unlike traditional malware focused on data theft or espionage, BadIIS manipulates web traffic to redirect users to illicit gambling sites, showcasing how attackers are increasingly blending cybercrime with fraudulent online activities. This highlights the evolving monetization strategies of threat groups, where compromised servers become tools for generating revenue rather than just conduits for malware distribution.
  • BadIIS not only compromises web servers but also raises concerns about the broader implications of such attacks. By embedding itself into IIS servers, the malware allows attackers to maintain persistent access, giving them control over website traffic. This persistence means that even after the initial campaign ends, the compromised servers remain vulnerable to further exploitation. Infected organizations risk long-term exposure, potentially leading to secondary infections, data breaches, or being unknowingly leveraged in future cyberattacks.
  • Beyond immediate financial motives, the BadIIS campaign underscores the risks associated with compromised web servers. These attacks do not just affect organizations directly targeted but also create a ripple effect by enabling further malware infections, phishing schemes, and reputation damage. The ability of BadIIS to alter web content and manipulate traffic flows demonstrates how attackers are refining their techniques to bypass traditional security measures, making proactive detection and monitoring critical in defending against such evolving threats.

ETLM ASSESSMENT
From the ETLM perspective, CYFIRMA anticipates that as cybercriminals refine their techniques, future variants of BadIIS or similar malware could evolve beyond SEO manipulation and website redirection. Organizations that rely on web infrastructure for operations, customer engagement, or internal systems may face persistent risks, where their own servers unknowingly become tools for cybercrime. Future versions of BadIIS-like threats might inject malicious scripts that harvest login credentials or manipulate web content to distribute malware. Employees accessing company resources through infected servers may inadvertently expose sensitive data, leading to widespread security breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. As these threats evolve, they may expand across regions and industries, creating new challenges for businesses as attackers refine their monetization and exploitation tactics.

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Identify assets that may be vulnerable to attackers and ensure they conduct regular checks for the latest security patches.
  • Configure organization’s intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), or any network defence mechanisms in place to alert on — and upon review, consider blocking connection attempts to and from — the external IP addresses and domains listed in the appendix.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Restrict administrative access to IIS servers and enforce strong, unique passwords with multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all privileged accounts.
  • Firewalls should be used to control and monitor network traffic to and from IIS servers, limiting exposure to potential threats.
  • Move beyond the traditional model of security awareness towards Improved Simulation and training exercises that mimic real attack scenarios, account for behaviors that lead to a compromise, and are measured against real attacks the organization receives.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed because vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
  • In addition to applying patches in public-facing infrastructure:
  • Consider deploying and configuring a File Integrity Monitoring solution to monitor and/or prevent the creation of files, especially on web servers outside of maintenance windows.

Weekly Intelligence Trends/Advisory

1. Weekly Attack Type and Trends

Key Intelligence Signals:

  • Attack Type: Ransomware Attacks, Phishing, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Data Leaks.
  • Objective: Unauthorized Access, Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains, Espionage.
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Financial Loss, Reputational Damage, Loss of Intellectual Property, Operational Disruption.
  • Ransomware – Qilin Ransomware, Hunters International Ransomware| Malware – BadIIS
  • Qilin Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
  • Hunters International Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
  • Please refer to the trending malware advisory for details on the following:
  • Malware – BadIIS
  • Behaviour –Most of these malwares use phishing and social engineering techniques as their initial attack vectors. Apart from these techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, defense evasion, and persistence tactics are being observed.

2. Threat Actor in Focus

Analysis of HWP malware incidents attributed to the ‘APT37’ group, delivered via K Messenger

  • Threat actor: APT37
  • Initial Attack Vector: Spear Phishing (targeting via KMessenger)
  • Objective: Espionage
  • Target Technology: Windows
  • Target Geography: South Korea
  • Business Impact: Data exfiltration, Operational downtime

Summary:
The APT37 group, also referred to as the “RoKRAT” group, utilizes a fileless attack strategy, employing a shellcode structure with a hidden 32-bit EXE executable module targeting South Korea. The executable is triggered via XOR logic, allowing it to be activated through PowerShell and shellcode, enabling the malware to execute directly in memory, without leaving any traces on disk. This approach, often referred to as “in- memory execution,” makes detection more difficult by bypassing traditional file-based security measures. Once activated, the RoKRAT module collects sensitive data from the infected machine, including login credentials, email accounts, and online messenger data. This information is then exfiltrated through the pCloud API Token key, a cloud-based storage service, further complicating detection efforts. Additionally, the attackers can install remote control add-ons, providing them with the ability to carry out further exploitation depending on their objectives.

The attack exploits the fact that many users store multiple passwords and remain logged into various services on their personal devices. If the victim leaves their computer unattended or moves around while it’s still on, the attacker can remotely access messenger services or other applications without permission. This allows the attacker to spread malicious files or further compromise the system. The report emphasizes the importance of not leaving computers on in work environments to mitigate such risks.

The attack typically starts with a spear-phishing attempt, wherein the attacker targets the victim with malicious files, often embedded in seemingly legitimate documents.

These files collect information about the victim’s system and can then be used to distribute additional malicious payloads, especially through messaging platforms. The report also highlights the growing sophistication of APT37’s tactics, such as using group chat rooms in messenger applications to further their attacks. Even files sent from trusted contacts can be weaponized to steal identities and carry out further attacks

Relevancy & Insights:
APT37, also known as the RoKRAT group, has been consistently targeting organizations, primarily in South Korea, with sophisticated cyberattacks. Their past operations have heavily relied on spear-phishing techniques, exploiting vulnerabilities in common applications like Microsoft Office. APT37’s use of malicious OLE objects in documents has been a hallmark of their attacks, allowing them to execute code without detection. They have also relied on fileless methods, such as embedding shellcode within documents or leveraging PowerShell, making it harder for traditional security systems to detect their activity. In earlier campaigns, they used trusted contacts and messaging platforms to spread malware and gain access to sensitive systems. The current RoKRAT attack follows a similar pattern but has evolved further. The group now uses cloud-based storage for exfiltrating stolen data and installs remote control modules, demonstrating an increasing sophistication in their tactics to maintain persistence and evade detection while further compromising targeted systems.

ETLM Assessment:
APT37 primarily targets organizations in South Korea, though their reach extends to other regions in Asia and beyond. Their focus includes industries such as government, defense, technology, and telecommunications. APT37 is known for exploiting vulnerabilities in widely used technologies, particularly Microsoft Office, through spear-phishing emails and malicious documents, such as those containing OLE objects.

Earlier, they relied heavily on file-based malware, including remote access tools, while current operations emphasize fileless techniques using PowerShell, shellcode, and cloud-based exfiltration (e.g., pCloud). The group has historically used variants of malware like Emmental, and their attacks often include remote control implants and keyloggers. The threat landscape shows APT37’s continued evolution in evading detection, utilizing social engineering, and deploying sophisticated exfiltration methods. Looking ahead, their tactics are likely to become even more advanced, utilizing zero- day vulnerabilities and more aggressive use of cloud services for persistence and data theft.

Recommendations:

Strategic Recommendations

  • Enhance Threat Intelligence Sharing: Ensure continuous integration of threat intelligence and enrich existing detection systems with Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) shared in the report.
  • Security Awareness Training: Conduct regular training to raise awareness among employees about phishing tactics, particularly spear-phishing and social engineering, which APT37 uses for initial access.

Tactical Recommendations

  • Advanced Detection and Response (EDR): Strengthen endpoint detection and response systems with anomaly-based detection rules to detect suspicious PowerShell activity and shellcode executions associated with fileless attacks.
  • Cloud Security Hardening: Implement robust monitoring for cloud storage and services (e.g., PCloud) to identify unauthorized exfiltration attempts or communications with known C2 servers.

Operational Recommendations

  • SOC Playbooks and Incident Response: Review and update incident response playbooks to address fileless attack scenarios, with a focus on the detection of anomalous processes or abnormal PowerShell behavior. Ensure SOC analysts are equipped with the tools to quickly isolate compromised endpoints.
  • Network Segmentation: Limit lateral movement by segmenting critical networks and implementing strict access control policies, especially for messaging and communication platforms that are commonly targeted by APT37.
  • Regular Patch Management: Ensure that all systems, particularly Office software, are kept up to date with the latest security patches to prevent exploitation of known.

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

Tactics ID Technique
Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment
Execution T1106 Native API
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1221 Template Injection
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1573 Encrypted Channel

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

3. Major Geopolitical Developments in Cybersecurity

Thailand cuts power to Myanmar to disrupt scam hubs
The Thai government cut off power to five towns in Myanmar along the border of northern Thailand in an effort to disrupt online scam compounds. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra told the press: “We must take care of our people first. The impact on Thai people and our country’s image has been enormous. It’s time to take decisive action.”

After Myanmar’s 2021 coup, organized criminal gangs established compounds in the area, using them as hubs to orchestrate scams targeting victims worldwide. Many workers in these compounds are effectively enslaved, having been deceived into taking jobs under false pretenses. The majority of these gangs are operated by Chinese nationals.

ETLM Assessment:
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in northern Laos have effectively become Chinese enclaves, with the most infamous being the Golden Triangle SEZ in Bokeo province. Situated along the Mekong River at the intersection of Thailand and Myanmar, the zone is controlled by the Chinese-owned Kings Romans Group under a 99-year land lease. Reports have repeatedly exposed widespread criminal activity in the SEZ, including money laundering, illegal wildlife trade, and online scam centers, which have proliferated in high-rise buildings within the zone. While Chinese authorities conducted joint raids in some of the zones last year, the problem these scammers are causing over all of Southeast Asia does not seem to be a priority for the Chinese government, let alone the crumbling Myanmar junta.

4. Rise in Malware/Ransomware and Phishing

The Qilin Ransomware Impacts HIKARI SEIKO CO. LTD

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Manufacturing
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: Qilin Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; HIKARI SEIKO CO. LTD. (https[:]//www[.]hikari-seiko[.]co[.]jp), was compromised by Qilin Ransomware. HIKARI SEIKO CO. LTD is a Japan-based top manufacturer of universal joints and precision automotive parts, such as universal joints and oil jets. The compromised data includes emails, reports, maintenance records, restricted-access drawings, production enhancements, cost reduction strategies, labor expenses, pricing matrices, packaging details, quality control records, employee information, an employee database backup, and customer details. The affected companies include Aisin, BYD, ZEEKR, FORD, HONDA, and others. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 502.50 GB.

The following screenshot was observed published on the dark web:

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • Qilin (also known as Agenda) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group first observed in July 2022. It employs a double extortion method, encrypting victims’ data and exfiltrating it, threatening to leak it on their data leak site (DLS) if the ransom is not paid.
  • Qilin maintains variants written in both Golang and Rust, targeting both Windows and Linux operating systems.
  • Qilin affiliates gain initial access via social engineering attacks like phishing emails with malicious attachments and valid credentials that have been leaked or purchased.
  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets countries, such as the United States of America, Canada, France, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.
  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Health Care Providers, Business Support Services, Manufacturing, Heavy Construction, and Retail.
  • Based on the Qilin Ransomware victims list from 1st January 2024 to 12th February 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by Qilin Ransomware from 1st January 2024 to 12th February 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Qilin ransomware poses a significant threat to organizations of all sizes. Its evolving tactics, including double extortion (data encryption and leak threats), cross-platform capabilities (Windows and Linux, including VMware ESXi), and focus on speed and evasion make it a particularly dangerous actor.

The Hunters International Ransomware Impacts Sakai Souken Co., Ltd

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Manufacturing and Construction
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: Hunters International Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; Sakai Souken Co., Ltd (www[.]sakai[.]co[.]jp) was compromised by Hunters International Ransomware. Sakai Souken Co., Ltd is a Japanese company in the manufacturing and construction industry. The data, which has been breached, has not yet appeared on the leak site, indicating that negotiations between the affected party and the ransomware group may be underway. The compromised data includes confidential and sensitive information belonging to the organization. The scale of the data exposure measures approximately 604.4 GB, comprising a total of 2,52,669 discrete files.

The following screenshot was observed published on the dark web:

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • Hunters International is a ransomware group that has gained significant attention since its emergence in October 2023. The group operates under a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model and is known for its aggressive tactics, particularly focusing on data exfiltration alongside file encryption.
  • Recently we observed that Hunters International exploited vulnerabilities in Oracle WebLogic servers (CVE-2025-21535 CVSS Score; 9.8) to gain initial access to victim networks. This technique has been a common entry point for the group, allowing them to conduct reconnaissance and lateral movement before executing ransomware attacks.
  • Hunters International operates as a RaaS provider, allowing affiliates to use their infrastructure for attacks. This model has enabled them to expand their reach and impact significantly.
  • The Hunters International Ransomware group primarily targets countries, such as the United States of America, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and India.
  • The Hunters International Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Heavy Construction, Business Support Services, Government Agencies, Telecommunications, and Industrial Machinery.
  • Based on the Hunters International Ransomware victims list from 1st January 2024 to 12th February 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by Hunters International Ransomware from 1st January 2024 to 12th February 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Hunters International ransomware represents a significant threat within the ransomware landscape due to its sophisticated tactics and focus on double extortion strategies. Organizations are advised to enhance their cybersecurity measures by implementing robust backup solutions, conducting regular employee training on phishing awareness.

5. Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Vulnerability in FortiOS CAPWAP

  • Attack Type: Vulnerabilities & Exploits
  • Target Technology: Operating system
  • Vulnerability: CVE-2024-35279
  • CVSS Base Score: 7.7 Source
  • Vulnerability Type: Stack-based buffer overflow
  • Summary: The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target system.

Relevancy & Insights:
The vulnerability exists due to a boundary error in FortiOS CAPWAP control. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted UDP packets to the affected service, trigger a stack-based buffer overflow, and execute arbitrary code on the target system.

Impact:
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in complete compromise of the vulnerable system.

Affected Products:
https[:]//www[.]fortiguard[.]com/psirt/FG-IR-24-160

Recommendations:
Monitoring and Detection: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify unusual system behavior that might indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.

TOP 5 AFFECTED PRODUCTS OF THE WEEK
This week, CYFIRMA researchers have observed significant impacts on various technologies, due to a range of vulnerabilities. The following are the top 5 most affected technologies.

ETLM Assessment:
Vulnerability in FortiOS CAPWAP control can pose significant threats to user privacy and security. This can impact various industries globally, including technology, finance, healthcare, and beyond. Ensuring the security of FortiOS CAPWAP control is crucial for maintaining the integrity and protection of users’ data worldwide. Therefore, addressing these vulnerabilities is essential to safeguarding wireless network communications, centralized access point management, and secure data transmission across different geographic regions and sectors.

6. Latest Cyber-Attacks, Incidents, and Breaches

RansomHub Ransomware attacked and published the data of Supreme Group

  • Threat Actors: RansomHub Ransomware
  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Leak, Financial Gains
  • Target Technology: Web Applications
  • Target Industry: Conglomerate- Manufacturing, IT, leisure and hospitality, real estate, investments, and luxury
  • Target Geography: India
  • Business Impact: Operational Disruption, Data Loss, Financial Loss, Potential Reputational Damage.

Summary:
Recently, we observed that RansomHub Ransomware attacked and published the data of Supreme Group(https[:]//supremegroup[.]co[.]in/) on its dark web website. Supreme Group is an India-based conglomerate with a multitude of business interests across various sectors such as commodities, IT, leisure and hospitality, real estate, investments, and luxury. The data leak, following the ransomware attack, encompasses sensitive and confidential records, originating from the organizational database. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 102 GB.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • The RansomHub Ransomware group operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), allowing affiliates to leverage its infrastructure for attacks. They have adopted a “big game hunting” strategy, targeting larger enterprises that are more likely to pay substantial ransoms.
  • Recently we observed the RansomHub Ransomware group deploying a Python-based backdoor after initial access via malware like SocGholish, which is used to maintain persistent access and facilitate lateral movement.
  • RansomHub has been linked to the ShadowSyndicate hacking group, which has adopted RansomHub’s ransomware for its operations. ShadowSyndicate reportedly shifted to using RansomHub due to lucrative affiliate rates, offering up to 90% of ransom payments to affiliates.

ETLM Assessment:
According to recent assessments by CYFIRMA, RansomHub has quickly emerged as a major threat in the ransomware landscape, utilizing aggressive tactics and a strong affiliate model. Organizations are urged to strengthen their cybersecurity defenses and stay alert to potential attacks as the group continues to evolve and expand its operations.

7. Data Leaks

Indonesian government Kota Mojokerto Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data Leak
  • Target Industry: Government
  • Target Geography: Indonesia
  • Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data sale related to the Indonesian government Kota Mojokerto(https[:]//mojokertokota[.]go[.]id/) in an underground forum. The Government of Kota Mojokerto, Indonesia, is responsible for managing the city’s administration, public services, and regional development. The government operates through various departments and agencies that oversee different sectors, including infrastructure, economy, social welfare, and public safety. The leaked data consists of SQL database files and a portion of Indonesian identity card (KTP) information. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 6 GB. The breach has been linked to a threat actor identified as “KryptonSec My.”

Source: Underground Forums

The Body Shop Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data Leak
  • Target Geography: Cosmetics
  • Target Industry: Thailand
  • Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to The Body Shop(https[:]//thebodyshop[.]co[.]th/) in an underground forum. The Body Shop is a revolutionary cosmetics supermarket in Thailand. The compromised data includes customers’ email addresses, names, gender, dates of birth, and address details (both billing and shipping, including country, state, and zip code), as well as billing amounts and billing addresses. The breach has been attributed to a threat actor known as “CanyonGod.”

Source: Underground Forums

Relevancy & Insights:
Financially motivated cybercriminals are continuously scouring for exposed and vulnerable systems and applications to exploit. A significant number of these malicious actors congregate within underground forums, where they discuss cybercrime and trade stolen digital assets. Operating discreetly, these opportunistic attackers target unpatched systems or vulnerabilities in applications to illicitly gain access and steal valuable data. Subsequently, the pilfered data is advertised for sale within underground markets, where it can be acquired, repurposed, and utilized by other malicious actors in further illicit activities.

ETLM Assessment:
A new threat actor, “CanyonGod,” has emerged, and their motives remain unclear, though financial gain, reputational damage, or a combination of both are possible. This actor is responsible for a significant data leak impacting The Body Shop Thailand and its customers. The compromised data includes personally identifiable information (PII), creating substantial risks such as identity theft, phishing attacks, and targeted marketing campaigns. This assessment analyzes the threat landscape, and attack lifecycle, and recommends mitigation strategies to address this incident.

Recommendations: Enhance the cybersecurity posture by

  • Updating all software products to their latest versions is essential to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited.
  • Ensure proper database configuration to mitigate the risk of database-related attacks.
  • Establish robust password management policies, incorporating multi-factor authentication and role-based access, to fortify credential security and prevent unauthorized access.

8. Other Observations

The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to SkidBin in an underground forum. SkidBin was a website designed for users to share text-based content, such as code snippets or written information. It offered features like paste management, editing, and deletion for registered users. The compromised data includes ID, username, hashed passwords, creation date, rank, bio, profile pictures, account status, name, color(s), and login tokens. The total dataset consists of 2,423 rows and is in SQL format. The breach has been attributed to a threat actor known as “Jayze.”

Source: Underground forums

The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to VideoToolbox (https[:]//www[.]videotoolbox[.]com/) in an underground forum. VideoToolbox is a free online video editor that enables users to convert, crop, merge, and record videos with ease. The leaked data includes ID, profile ID, activation ID, email, status, password, payment status, conversion mode, registration date, newsletter subscription details, as well as sensitive and confidential information. The breach has been attributed to a threat actor identified as “Zix.”

Source: Underground forums

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Attack Surface Management should be adopted by organizations, ensuring that a continuous closed-loop process is created between attack surface monitoring and security testing.
  • Deploy a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
  • Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) in the overall security posture that acts as a proactive defence against external threats targeting unsuspecting customers.
  • Implement a holistic security strategy that includes controls for attack surface reduction, effective patch management, active network monitoring, through next generation security solutions and ready to go incident response plan.
  • Create risk-based vulnerability management with deep knowledge about each asset. Assign a triaged risk score based on the type of vulnerability and criticality of the asset to help ensure that the most severe and dangerous vulnerabilities are dealt with first.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Take advantage of global Cyber Intelligence providing valuable insights on threat actor activity, detection, and mitigation techniques.
  • Proactively monitor the effectiveness of risk-based information security strategy, the security controls applied and the proper implementation of security technologies, followed by corrective actions remediations, and lessons learned.
  • Move beyond the traditional model of security awareness towards improved simulation and training exercises that mimic real attack scenarios, account for behaviours that lead to a compromised and are measured against real attacks the organization receives.
  • Consider implementing Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) security systems to compensate for the shortcoming of EDR and SIEM solutions.
  • Detection processes are tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events. Timely communication of anomalies and continuously evolved to keep up with refined ransomware threats.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthen defences based on tactical intelligence provided.
  • Deploy detection technologies that are behavioural anomaly-based to detect ransomware attacks and help to take appropriate measures.
  • Implement a combination of security control such as reCAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and Account lockout to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
  • Ensure email and web content filtering uses real-time blocklists, reputation services, and other similar mechanisms to avoid accepting content from known and potentially malicious sources.

Situational Awareness – Cyber News

Please find the Geography-Wise and Industry-Wise breakup of cyber news for the last 5 days as part of the situational awareness pillar.

Geography-Wise Graph

Industry-Wise Graph

For situational awareness intelligence and specific insights mapped to your organisation’s geography, industry, technology, please access DeCYFIR.