Self Assessment

Weekly Intelligence Report – 07 November 2025

Published On : 2025-11-06
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Weekly Intelligence Report – 07 November 2025

Ransomware of the week

CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team would like to highlight ransomware trends and insights gathered while monitoring various forums. This includes multiple – industries, geography, and technology – that could be relevant to your organization.

Type: Ransomware
Target Technology: Windows

Introduction
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team has found Monkey Ransomware while monitoring various underground forums as part of our Threat Discovery Process.

Monkey Ransomware
Researchers have identified Monkey ransomware as a malicious program that encrypts user data and appends the “.monkey” extension to affected files. It uses strong encryption algorithms, making decryption without the attackers’ assistance nearly impossible. Once active, it also attempts to delete backups and exfiltrate sensitive information from the infected system. The ransomware typically spreads through phishing emails, malicious downloads, and trojans, and it can disguise itself as legitimate files or software. Detected under various names by multiple security vendors, Monkey ransomware primarily targets Windows systems and prevents victims from accessing their data.

Screenshot of files encrypted by ransomware (Source: Surface Web)

The ransom note, dropped as “How_to_recover_your_files.txt,” informs victims that their network has been compromised, backups destroyed, and data stolen. It instructs them to contact the attackers via email within 24 hours, warning that failure to comply will increase the ransom and risk public data exposure. The message forbids deleting or modifying encrypted files and offers victims a “test decryption” as proof of recovery capability. The note emphasizes strict compliance with the attackers’ instructions to avoid permanent data loss or leaks.

The appearance of Prey’s ransom note (HOW_TO_RECOVER_DATA. txt) (Source: Surface Web)

The following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework

Tactic Technique ID Technique Name
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1106 Native API
Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege Escalation T1055 Process Injection
Privilege Escalation T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege Escalation T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion T1055 Process Injection
Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Defense Evasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution
Defense Evasion T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification
Defense Evasion T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Defense Evasion T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Discovery T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Impact T1485 Data Destruction
Impact T1489 Service Stop
Impact T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Relevancy and Insights:

  • The ransomware primarily affects the Windows operating system, which is commonly utilized in enterprise environments across multiple industries.
  • Detect-debug-environment: This approach is used to find out whether the ransomware is being watched in settings like virtual computers, sandboxes, or under debugging tools. The malware may employ timing to identify discrepancies, search for system characteristics unusual in actual user computers, or search for certain programs, drivers, or artefacts connected to analysis tools in order to carry out this check. In order to evade detection and complicate in-depth analysis, the malicious program may alter its behaviour in response to such events, such as delaying execution, stopping, or omitting important payload operations.
  • The ransomware terminates processes such as vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet and wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive to delete Volume Shadow Copies, which are used by Windows for backup and restore. By removing these shadow copies, the malware ensures that victims cannot recover their files via system restore points or backup utilities.

ETLM Assessment:
CYFIRMA assesses Monkey as a modular file-encryptor that appends .monkey and drops a How_to_recover_your_files.txt recovery note. Telemetry and sample analysis show distinct components for encryption, persistence, and data collection/exfiltration, plus implementation breadcrumbs that make the codebase easy to repackage or extend. Those traits, identifiable file/note artifacts, evidence of commodity tooling, and publicly observed samples lower the friction for iterative change: affiliates or developers can swap crypto primitives, add stealthy persistence or credential harvesters, or graft in loaders/beacons to broaden delivery and maintain access.

Operationally, Monkey could follow predictable RaaS commoditization paths: affiliate programs paired with initial-access brokers or stealer logs, and use of double/multi-extortion (encryption + data leaks). The most predictive escalation signals will be leak-site postings tied to Monkey indicators, sightings of Monkey artifacts alongside brokered access or commercial loaders, and chatter advertising affiliate offers.

Sigma rule:
title: WannaCry Ransomware Activity tags:
– attack.lateral-movement
– attack.t1210
– attack.discovery
– attack.t1083
– attack.defense-evasion
– attack.t1222.001
– attack.impact
– attack.t1486
– attack.t1490
– detection.emerging-threats logsource:
category: process_creation product: windows
detection: selection_img:
– Image|endswith:
– ‘\tasksche.exe’
– ‘\mssecsvc.exe’
– ‘\taskdl.exe’
– ‘\taskhsvc.exe’
– ‘\taskse.exe’
– ‘\111.exe’
– ‘\lhdfrgui.exe’
# – ‘\diskpart.exe’ # cannot be used in a rule of level critical
– ‘\linuxnew.exe’
– ‘\wannacry.exe’
– Image|contains: ‘WanaDecryptor’ selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: ‘@[email protected]’ condition: 1 of selection_*
fields:
– CommandLine
– ParentCommandLine falsepositives:
– Unknown level: critical
(Source: Surface Web)

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise control of your security systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Implement competent security protocols and encryption, authentication, or access credentials configurations to access critical systems in your cloud and local environments.
  • Ensure that backups of critical systems are maintained, which can be used to restore data in case a need arises.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • A data breach prevention plan must be developed considering, (a) the type of data being managed by the company; (b) the remediation process; (c) where and how the data is stored; (d) if there is an obligation to notify the local authority.
  • Enable zero-trust architecture and multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate the compromise of credentials.
  • Foster a culture of cybersecurity, where you encourage and invest in employee training so that security is an integral part of your organization.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
  • Add the Sigma rule for threat detection and monitoring, which will help to detect anomalies in log events, identify and monitor suspicious activities.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening the defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.

Trending Malware of the Week

Type: Trojan | Objectives: Credential theft, Financial Fraud, Data exfiltration | Target Technology: Android OS | Target Industry: Finance sector | Target Geography: Italy, Brazil

CYFIRMA collects data from various forums, based on which the trend is ascertained. We identified a few popular malware that were found to be distributed in the wild to launch cyberattacks on organizations or individuals.

Active Malware of the week
This week, “Herodotus” is trending.

Overview of Herodotus Malware
Researchers recently identified a new Android malware dubbed Herodotus, a fresh and evolving threat that blends original components with elements borrowed from the Brokewell family. Unlike typical successors, Herodotus represents a new creation rather than a direct upgrade. It spreads through deceptive methods, such as Smishing, where victims are lured into downloading a malicious dropper via fraudulent text messages.

Once activated, the malware focuses on complete device control, with emerging capabilities that attempt to imitate human behavior—a tactic aimed at evading biometric and behavioral security checks. Current campaigns have been detected in Italy and Brazil, while additional overlay templates uncovered by researchers suggest potential targeting of financial organizations in the United States, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Poland, and even cryptocurrency services. Its promotion as a Malware-as-a- Service during development reflects a pattern often observed in campaigns that later expand in scope or capability.

Attack Method
Herodotus typically reaches victims through sideloading, frequently after a deceptive SMS lure that directs users to download a dropper. That dropper has been seen only delivering Herodotus so far. The moment the dropper runs, it wastes no time. Its first move is to sneak past Android 13’s new defenses, installing its hidden payload under the radar. With the payload in place, it awakens Herodotus, the true agent of the operation. Then, like a magician’s trick, the dropper leads the user straight to the Accessibility Service settings, urging them to flip the fatal switch. Once the service is enabled, Herodotus throws up a fake “loading” screen — a clever illusion meant to hide the permissions quietly being granted behind the curtain.

After installation, the malware prepares for full device takeover. It inventories installed apps and reports them back to a control server, which replies with targets and overlay resources. When a designated app is opened, Herodotus places a blocking overlay that hides the genuine interface and presents a counterfeit login screen, capturing credentials while keeping the real app out of the victim’s view.

Operators can remotely control infected phones via Accessibility features — tapping elements, swiping, navigating, and inputting text. To reduce detection by behavior- based fraud engines, the malware offers a “delayed text” mode that sends characters one-by-one with randomized pauses, making automated input resemble human typing. This humanizing step is a notable distinction from many comparable device-takeover trojans.

Beyond overlays and remote control, Herodotus includes standard banking-trojan tools: SMS interception for one-time codes, screen capture and Accessibility logging, and a command channel using MQTT across multiple subdomains. Active campaigns have been observed in Italy and Brazil, and screenshots circulating on underground forums show operator consoles with controls for the human-like input feature.

The following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework for Mobile

Tactic Technique ID Technique Name
Initial Access T1660 Phishing
Privilege Escalation T1626 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion T1628.002 Hide Artifacts: User Evasion
Defense Evasion T1516 Input Injection
Defense Evasion T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information
Credential Access T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features
Credential Access T1517 Access Notifications
Credential Access T1414 Clipboard Data
Credential Access T1417 Input Capture
Discovery T1418 Software Discovery
Collection T1453 Abuse Accessibility Features
Collection T1517 Access Notifications
Collection T1414 Clipboard Data
Collection T1417 Input Capture
Collection T1430 Location Tracking
Collection T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
Collection T1513 Screen Capture
Command and Control T1437 Application Layer Protocol

INSIGHTS

  • Herodotus stands out for its ability to deceive users through convincing social- engineering tactics, blending technical precision with psychological manipulation. Instead of relying solely on complex exploits, it focuses on crafting authentic-looking prompts and app interfaces that lure victims into granting access or installing malicious components. This focus on believability rather than brute-force infection shows how attackers are refining persuasion as their main weapon.
  • Beyond the technical layer, the real damage of Herodotus lies in the human aftermath. Victims often face confusion and distress once their data or funds are compromised, with lingering anxiety over digital trust. The process of recovery, resetting accounts, verifying transactions, and safeguarding personal information—can be emotionally draining, creating a lasting sense of vulnerability even after the infection is removed.
  • At the same time, Herodotus reflects how cybercrime ecosystems have evolved into streamlined operations. The malware’s infrastructure and operator tools are designed for accessibility, allowing even less skilled actors to run targeted fraud campaigns. This shift from niche technical circles to more business-like models reveals how organized and scalable cybercrime has become, turning digital deception into a structured enterprise rather than a solitary pursuit.

ETLM ASSESSMENT
From the ETLM perspective, CYFIRMA anticipates that Herodotus may eventually expand beyond its current reach, evolving into a more widespread threat across regions and user groups. As its developers refine features and make it more accessible through Malware-as-a-Service platforms, this type of attack could surface in new markets where mobile banking and digital payments are growing rapidly. The combination of human-like interaction and remote-control capabilities may enable broader fraud operations, allowing attackers to exploit both individuals and digital ecosystems on a larger scale. Over time, campaigns inspired by Herodotus could influence how future mobile threats are developed, setting a new standard for sophistication in Android malware.

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

YARA Rules
rule Herodotus_Indicators
{
meta:
description = “Detects Herodotus malware Indicators” author = “CYFIRMA”
malware = “Herodotus”
strings:
// SHA256 File Hashes
$sha256_1 = “53ee40353e17d069b7b7783529edda968ad9ae25a0777f6a644b99551b412083”
condition:
any of ($sha256*)
}

Recommendations:

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

  • Implement Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy to enhance corporate data security by monitoring, managing, and securing mobile devices, such as laptops, smartphones, and tablets, that are used in enterprises.
  • Maintain an up-to-date inventory of all active software used within the organization and perform regular self-audits of workstations, servers, laptops, and mobile devices to identify unauthorized/ restricted software.
  • Configure the organization’s intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), or any network defence mechanisms in place to alert on — and upon review, consider blocking connection attempts to and from — the external IP addresses and domains listed in the appendix.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS:

  • Incorporate a written software policy that educates employees on good practices in relation to software and the potential implications of downloading and using restricted software.
  • Security Awareness training should be mandated for all company employees. The training should ensure that employees:
  • Avoid downloading and executing files from unverified sources.
  • Move beyond the traditional model of security awareness towards Improved Simulation and training exercises that mimic real attack scenarios, account for behaviors that lead to a compromise, and are measured against real attacks the organization receives.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening the defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and prevent attacker access. Keep MFA always-on for privileged accounts and apply risk- based MFA for normal accounts.
  • Evaluate the security and reputation of each piece of open-source software or utilities before usage.
  • Add the Yara rules for threat detection and monitoring, which will help to detect anomalies in log events and identify and monitor suspicious activities.

CYFIRMA’S WEEKLY INSIGHTS

1. Weekly Attack Types and Trends

Key Intelligence Signals:

  • Attack Type: Ransomware Attacks, Spear Phishing, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Data Leaks.
  • Objective: Unauthorized Access, Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains, Espionage.
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Financial Loss, Reputational Damage, Loss of Intellectual Property, Operational Disruption.
  • Ransomware – RansomHouse Ransomware, Qilin Ransomware| Malware – Herodotus
  • RansomHouse Ransomware– One of the ransomware groups.
  • Qilin Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
    Please refer to the trending malware advisory for details on the following:
  • Malware – Herodotus
    Behavior – Most of these malwares use phishing and social engineering techniques as their initial attack vectors. Apart from these techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, defense evasion, and persistence tactics are being observed.

2. Threat Actor in Focus

Advanced Threat Update: Bronze Butler (TICK) Exploits and Tactics

  • Threat Actor: BRONZE BUTLER aka TICK
  • Attack Type: Connection Proxy, Credential Dumping, Exploitation of Vulnerabilities (including Zero-Days), Malware Deployment, Social Engineering Attacks, Use of Commodity Tools, Data Exfiltration.
  • Objective: Information theft, Espionage.
  • Suspected Target Technology: Office Suites Software, Operating System, Web Application, and Lanscope Endpoint Manager.
  • Suspected Target Geography: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan.
  • Suspected Target Industries: Aerospace & Defense, Capital Goods, Defense, Electronics, Government, High-Tech, IT Services, Politics, Satellite, Software & Services, Technology, Technology Hardware & Equipment.
  • Business Impact: Data Theft, Operational Disruption, Reputational Damage.

About the Threat Actor
The “TICK” threat group has carried out cyber espionage operations targeting organizations in South Korea and Japan for several years. Its primary focus is on companies that possess valuable intellectual property or sensitive data, particularly within the defense and high-tech sectors. The group is known for using its custom malware Daserf, along with a mix of both commodity and proprietary tools. Tick also exploits software vulnerabilities and employs social engineering tactics to achieve its objectives.

Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities

CVE ID Affected Products CVSS Score Exploit Links
CVE-2025-61932 Lanscope Endpoint Manager 9.8
CVE-2021-27065 Microsoft Exchange Server 7.8 Link1, link2
CVE-2021-26855 Microsoft Exchange Server 9.8 Link1, link2, link3, link4
CVE-2021-26858 Microsoft Exchange Server 7.8
CVE-2021-26857 Microsoft Exchange Server 7.8
CVE-2018-0802 Microsoft Office 7.8

TTPs based on MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Tactic ID Technique
Resource Development T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Initial Access T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spear phishing Attachment
Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows
Command Shell
Execution T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
Execution T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Execution T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Execution T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Execution T1053.002 Scheduled Task/Job: At
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Persistence T1053.002 Scheduled Task/Job: At
Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Privilege Escalation T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Privilege Escalation T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Privilege Escalation T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Privilege Escalation T1053.002 Scheduled Task/Job: At
Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Defense Evasion T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
Defense Evasion T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Defense Evasion T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Defense Evasion T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
Defense Evasion T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding
Defense Evasion T1036.002 Masquerading: Right-to-Left Override
Credential Access T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1007 System Service Discovery
Discovery T1124 System Time Discovery
Discovery T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
Discovery T1518 Software Discovery
Discovery T1018 Remote System Discovery
Lateral Movement T1080 Taint Shared Content
Lateral Movement T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
Collection T1113 Screen Capture
Collection T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Collection T1039 Data from Network Shared
Collection T1005 Data from Local System
Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Command and Control T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
Command and Control T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

Latest Developments Observed
The threat actor is suspected of exploiting a zero-day vulnerability CVE-2025-61932 in Motex LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager, a popular endpoint management solution widely deployed across Japan and other Asian nations, and deploying Gokcpdoor malware. The motive appears to be the theft of confidential information.

ETLM Insights
TICK is an espionage-focused Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group recognized for its methodical, stealth-driven operations and long-term persistence across campaigns. The group leverages a combination of custom malware frameworks and legitimate administrative tools to maintain covert access, lateral movement, and command within targeted networks.

Recent intelligence indicates that TICK has evolved its operational sophistication, incorporating zero-day exploitation, modular malware architectures, fileless execution, and encrypted communications to enhance both stealth and operational resilience.

TICK’s activity exemplifies a disciplined, intelligence-oriented approach, emphasizing sustained infiltration, covert reconnaissance, and discreet exfiltration of sensitive information—particularly from defense, technology, and critical infrastructure sectors.

The group’s continuous evolution underscores the importance of comprehensive endpoint visibility, identity and access security, and anomaly-based behavioral detection to identify and mitigate stealth-oriented, long-term intrusions characteristic of TICK’s campaigns.

IOCs
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

YARA Rules
rule Tick_Indicators { meta:
description = “Detect CVEs, IPs, domains, and Mozi-related indicators” author = “CYFIRMA”
date = “2025-11-04”

strings:
// Example CVEs
$cve1 = “CVE-2025-61932”
$cve2 = “CVE-2021-27065”
$cve3 = “CVE-2021-26855”
$cve4 = “CVE-2021-26858”
$cve5 = “CVE-2021-26857”
$cve6 = “CVE-2018-0802”

// Example IPs
$ip1 = “208.91.197.27”
$ip2 = “208.73.211.165”
$ip3 = “87.248.203.253”
$ip4 = “127.0.0.1”
$ip5 = “91.195.240.94”
$ip6 = “64.233.167.99”

// Example domains
$domain1 = “iwdellebhavmei.com”
$domain2 = “ooxxsearch.com”
$domain3 = “babylon.network”
$domain4 = “icanhazip.com”
$domain5 = “thisislea.de”

// Example Mozi indicators (file names or strings)
$mozi1 = “win32 exe”
$mozi2 = “hrm3jvh9v.dll”
$mozi3 = “mtathreadattribute.exe”

condition:
any of ($cve*) or any of ($ip*) or any of ($domain*) or any of ($mozi*)
}

Recommendations

Strategic Recommendations

  • Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) as part of the overall security posture to proactively defend against impersonations and phishing attacks.
  • Deploy Zero Trust Policy that leverages tools like security information management, advanced security analytics platforms, security user behaviour analytics, and other analytics systems to help the organization’s security personnel observe in real-time what is happening within their networks so they can orient defences more intelligently.
  • Block exploit-like behaviour. Monitor endpoints memory to find behavioural patterns that are typically exploited, including unusual process handle requests. These patterns are features of most exploits, whether known or new. This will be able to provide effective protection against zero-day/critical exploits and more by identifying such patterns.

Management Recommendations

  • Invest in user education and implement standard operating procedures for the handling of financial and sensitive data transactions commonly targeted by impersonation attacks. Reinforce this training with context-aware banners and in-line prompts to help educate users.
  • Look for email security solutions that use ML- and AI-based anti-phishing technology for BEC protection to analyze conversation history to detect anomalies, as well as computer vision to analyze suspect links within emails.

Tactical Recommendations

  • Exert caution when opening email attachments or clicking on embedded links supplied via email communications.
  • For better protection coverage against email attacks (like spear phishing, business email compromise, or credential phishing attacks), organizations should augment built-in email security with layers that take a materially different approach to threat detection.
  • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
  • Add the YARA rules for threat detection and monitoring, which will help to detect anomalies in log events, identify and monitor suspicious activities.

3. Major Geopolitical Developments in Cybersecurity

Hacking campaign against Britain’s drinking water suppliers underway
Since early 2024, hackers have targeted Britain’s drinking water suppliers with at least five cyberattacks, as reported to the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI). These attacks, a record for any two-year span, did not compromise the safety of drinking water but impacted the organizations managing the supplies, underscoring British intelligence warnings of growing cyber threats to critical infrastructure. The DWI received 15 reports from suppliers between January 1, 2024, and October 20, 2025, under the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations, which form part of the legal framework for securing drinking water systems.

ETLM Assessment:
In recent years, the UK has faced a surge in cyber-attacks, with Russia frequently suspected as the driving force behind many of them. While definitive attribution remains complex, the sophistication of these attacks and the backdrop of geopolitical tensions strongly indicate Russian involvement. These attacks have targeted diverse organizations, causing widespread disruption and financial losses. Russia has solidified its position as a capable, motivated, and irresponsible cyber threat actor. Russian operatives have almost certainly escalated their cyber campaigns against Ukraine and its allies, aligning these operations with their military objectives and broader geopolitical ambitions.

Strained by the demands of an all-out war against Ukraine, Russia has increasingly outsourced cyber operations to privateers and other non-state actors. These groups, often beyond direct state control, introduce a heightened unpredictability to their activities. This trend is likely to persist, as the Kremlin grants these actors greater latitude. From Moscow’s perspective, fostering global instability serves to divert attention from its aggression in Ukraine, further stretching the resources of those who oppose it.

Myanmar scam center bombed
Thousands are escaping Myanmar to Thailand after a joint operation between Myanmar’s military government, China, and Thailand shut down a major cybercrime hub at the KK Park site as part of a broader crackdown on cross-border online scams and illegal gambling that began this fall. Located near Myawaddy, a significant trading town on the Myanmar-Thailand border opposite Mae Sot, KK Park operates in an area loosely controlled by Myanmar’s military government, alongside a local Karen ethnic minority militia serving as a Border Guard Force. Witnesses in Thailand reported hearing explosions and seeing smoke from the site as some of its buildings were bombed during the raid.

The Thai army’s Naresuan Task Force confirmed that Myanmar’s military and its Border Guard Force allies demolished parts of KK Park with explosives, with debris damaging several homes across the border in Thailand. Most of those fleeing Myanmar are believed to have worked at KK Park, often under coercion. Thai authorities in Tak province have established temporary shelters for them, noting they hail from 28 countries, including Thailand, India, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Kenya. These individuals are being processed to determine if they were victims of human trafficking, with plans for repatriation to their home countries.

ETLM Assessment:
Myanmar is infamous for hosting cyber scam operations that lure workers from abroad with false job promises, only to trap them in forced criminal activities. Despite the KK Park raid, Myanmar’s independent media, such as The Irrawaddy, report ongoing scam operations in the Myawaddy area. Cambodia also serves as a major hub for similar cybercrime activities, drawing global scrutiny earlier in October when the U.S. and U.K. imposed sanctions on a Cambodian cyber scam syndicate, with its alleged leader indicted by a U.S. federal court in New York.

KK Park’s sprawling compound and others nearby are run primarily by Chinese criminal gangs and guarded by local militia groups aligned to Myanmar’s military. Amid internet restrictions in Myanmar, scam centers heavily utilize Starlink connections. Last week, SpaceX disabled over 2,500 Starlink devices suspected of supporting cybercrime groups. Saw Taw Nee suggested the actual number could be higher, noting the network’s widespread use in the region. In Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, criminal networks operate large-scale cyber-fraud and scam centers, powered by sophisticated transnational syndicates. These groups collaborate with interconnected networks of money launderers, human traffickers, data brokers, and an expanding array of specialized service providers and facilitators.

4. Rise in Malware/Ransomware and Phishing

RansomHouse Ransomware Impacts ASKUL Corporation

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: E-commerce
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: RansomHouse Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan, ASKUL Corporation (https[:]//www[.]askul[.]co[.]jp/), was compromised by RansomHouse Ransomware. ASKUL Corporation is a prominent Japanese e- commerce company catering to both business-to-business (B2B) and business- to-consumer (B2C) markets. The company offers a wide range of products, including office supplies, daily essentials, medical items, and logistics services. The compromised data contains sensitive and confidential information pertaining to the organization, with the total volume of leaked data estimated to be approximately 1.1 terabytes.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • RansomHouse emerged in March of 2022 and is categorized as a multi-pronged extortion threat. The attackers exfiltrate all enticing data and threaten to post it all publicly.
  • The RansomHouse Ransomware group primarily targets countries such as the United States of America, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium.
  • The RansomHouse Ransomware group primarily targets industries, such as Consumer Goods & Services, Professional Goods & Services, Materials, Government & Civic, and Healthcare.
  • Based on the RansomHouse Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 04th November 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries most affected by the RansomHouse Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 04th November 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, RansomHouse ransomware predominantly targets large enterprises and high-value organizations through phishing and spear phishing campaigns. The group also employs third-party frameworks such as Vatet Loader, Metasploit, and Cobalt Strike to gain initial access and perform lateral movements within victim networks. RansomHouse typically skips data encryption, focusing instead on exfiltrating sensitive data to extort victims by threatening to publicly release the stolen information. This approach allows the group to maintain stealth and prolong their presence in targeted environments.

Qilin Ransomware Impacts Super Value Co., Ltd.

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Retail
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: Qilin Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary
CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan, Super Value Co., Ltd (https[:]//www[.]supervalue[.]jp/), was compromised by Qilin Ransomware. Super Value Co., Ltd is a Japan-based retail company. The company offers a wide range of products, including fresh foods, groceries, household goods, leisure and DIY supplies, car goods, pet products, home appliances, stationery, toys, and pharmaceuticals. The compromised data comprises sensitive financial information and other confidential organizational data, with the total size of the leaked data estimated at approximately 350 gigabytes.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets countries such as the United States of America, Canada, South Korea, France, and the United Kingdom.
  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Manufacturing, Professional Goods & Services, Healthcare, Finance, and Consumer Goods & Services.
  • Based on the Qilin Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 04th November 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries most affected by the Qilin Ransomware victims list from 1st Jan 2025 to 04th November 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Qilin ransomware poses a significant threat to organizations of all sizes. Its evolving tactics, including double extortion (data encryption and leak threats), cross-platform capabilities (Windows and Linux, including VMware ESXi), and a focus on speed and evasion, make it a particularly dangerous actor.

5. Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Vulnerability in SailPoint IdentityIQ

  • Attack Type: Vulnerabilities & Exploits
  • Target Technology: Server applications / Other server solutions
  • Vulnerability: CVE-2025-10280
  • CVSS Base Score: 7.1 Source
  • Vulnerability Type: Cross-site Scripting
  • Summary: The disclosed vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.

Relevancy & Insights:
The vulnerability exists due to insufficient sanitization of user- supplied data. A remote attacker can trick the victim to follow a specially crafted link and execute arbitrary HTML and script code in the user’s browser in the context of a vulnerable website.

Impact:
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to steal potentially sensitive information, change the appearance of the web page, perform phishing and drive-by-download attacks.

Affected Products:
https[:]//www[.]sailpoint[.]com/security-advisories/sailpoint- identityiq-incorrect-content-type-cross-site-scripting-vulnerability-cve-2025-10280

Recommendations:
Monitoring and Detection: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify unusual system behavior that might indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.

TOP 5 AFFECTED TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WEEK
This week, CYFIRMA researchers have observed significant impacts on various technologies due to a range of vulnerabilities. The following are the top 5 most affected technologies.

ETLM Assessment
Vulnerability in SailPoint IdentityIQ can pose significant threats to user privacy and organizational security. This can impact various industries globally, including finance, healthcare, government, and enterprise IT. Ensuring the security of SailPoint IdentityIQ is crucial for maintaining the integrity and protection of identity governance and access management systems worldwide.

6. Latest Cyber-Attacks, Incidents, and Breaches

Black Shrantac Ransomware attacked and published the data of Cypark Resources Berhad

  • Threat Actor: Black Shrantac Ransomware
  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Leak, Financial Gains
  • Target Technology: Web Applications
  • Target Industry: Renewable Energy and Environmental Engineering
  • Target Geography: Malaysia
  • Business Impact: Operational Disruption, Data Loss, Financial Loss, Potential Reputational Damage

Summary:
Recently, Black Shrantac Ransomware was observed attacking and publishing the data of Cypark Resources Berhad (www[.]cypark[.]com) on its dark web website. Cypark Resources Berhad is a leading Malaysian public listed company, specializing in integrated renewable energy, construction and engineering, green technology, environmental services, and waste management, including waste-to-energy (WTE) solutions. The data leak resulting from the ransomware attack on Cypark Resources Berhad includes financial information, such as invoices, insurance documents, banking records, asset details, and payroll data. It also contains human resources information like employee lists, email addresses, and physical addresses, as well as company data related to environmental engineering, landscaping, and infrastructure projects. The total volume of the compromised data is approximately 450 gigabytes.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:
Black Shrantac is a recently identified ransomware group first observed in September 2025, operating primarily as a data broker and extortion outfit. The group targets organizations, exfiltrating sensitive data and leveraging public pressure—often via a dedicated. onion (Tor) site—to coerce ransom payments.

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Black Shrantac Ransomware exemplifies the latest trend of fast-forming, adaptable data extortion groups that maintain an aggressive web presence to pressure victims using both threat and demonstration of data exposure.

7. Data Leaks

Thailand’s Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data leak
  • Target Industry: Government
  • Target Geography: Thailand
  • Objective: Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary: The CYFIRMA Research team observed that a threat actor, “Kazu,” claims to have breached Thailand’s Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE). The DOAE operates under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, providing farmers and the public with resources on crop cultivation, pest management, and agricultural technologies.

According to the actor, a database containing 5,426,069 records is being offered for sale. The allegedly compromised data includes:

  • ID card information
  • Full names
  • Nationality
  • Mobile phone numbers
  • Email addresses
  • Dates of birth
  • Main career
  • Minor career

The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the threat actor.

Source: Underground Forums

Yas Takaful Dubai Insurance Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data leak
  • Target Industry: Finance
  • Target Geography: The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
  • Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed that a threat actor claims to have breached Yas Takaful Dubai Insurance, an insurance provider based in the United Arab Emirates. The actor is advertising a database containing a significant amount of client and corporate information.

According to the actor, the compromised database contains over 450,000 lines of client information. The allegedly compromised data includes:

  • Full names
  • Dates of birth (DOB)
  • Phone numbers
  • Email addresses
  • Client financial details
  • Insurance claims information
  • Applicant resumes
  • The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the threat actor.

    • Full names
    • Patient medical records
    • Lab reports (e.g., ECG, USG)
    • Pre-authorization and consultation forms
    • Hospital admission and billing documents
    • Know Your Customer (KYC) files
    • Photo IDs
    • Aadhaar card details
    • PAN card details

    The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the threat actor.

    Source: Underground Forums

    Relevancy & Insights:
    Financially motivated cybercriminals are continuously looking for exposed and vulnerable systems and applications to exploit. A significant number of these malicious actors congregate within underground forums, where they discuss cybercrime and trade stolen digital assets. Operating discreetly, these opportunistic attackers target unpatched systems or vulnerabilities in applications to gain access and steal valuable data. Subsequently, the stolen data is advertised for sale within underground markets, where it can be acquired, repurposed, and utilized by other malicious actors in further illicit activities.

    ETLM Assessment:
    The threat actor “Kazu” has recently emerged as a notably active group engaged in data leak activities. Credible sources have tied the group to multiple security breaches involving unauthorized system access and attempts to sell stolen data on dark web marketplaces. The group’s ongoing operations illustrate the persistent and escalating cyber threats stemming from underground forums. These incidents reinforce the critical need for organizations to bolster cybersecurity through continuous monitoring, advanced threat intelligence, and proactive defense strategies to protect sensitive data and critical infrastructure.

    Recommendations: Enhance the cybersecurity posture by:

    1. Updating all software products to their latest versions is essential to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited.
    2. Ensure proper database configuration to mitigate the risk of database-related attacks.
    3. Establish robust password management policies, incorporating multi-factor authentication and role-based access to fortify credential security and prevent unauthorized access.

    8. Other Observations

    The CYFIRMA Research team observed that a threat actor claims to have breached Gateworks Corporation, a US-based design and manufacturing company. Gateworks specializes in industrial Single Board Computers (SBCs) and wireless solutions for embedded systems. The breach, which allegedly occurred in October 2025, is now being offered for sale on a dark web forum.

    According to the actor, the compromised data, which is being sold for $500, includes sensitive corporate documents. The data pack reportedly contains proprietary information and schematics from several of Gateworks’ partners and suppliers.

    The allegedly compromised partner documents include:

    • Trimble
    • DLC Display Co., Limited
    • Microchip
    • eGalax eMPIA Technology, lnc (EETI)
    • NPX
    • Max Integrated
    • Analog Devices (ADV)
    • User session data

    The authenticity of this breach remains unverified at the time of reporting, as the claim originates solely from the threat actor.

    Source: Underground Forums

    STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Attack Surface Management should be adopted by organisations, ensuring that a continuous closed-loop process is created between attack surface monitoring and security testing.
    • Deploy a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
    • Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) in the overall security posture that acts as a proactive defence against external threats targeting unsuspecting customers.
    • Implement a holistic security strategy that includes controls for attack surface reduction, effective patch management, and active network monitoring, through next-generation security solutions and a ready-to-go incident response plan.
    • Create risk-based vulnerability management with deep knowledge about each asset. Assign a triaged risk score based on the type of vulnerability and criticality of the asset to help ensure that the most severe and dangerous vulnerabilities are dealt with first.

    MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Take advantage of global Cyber Intelligence, providing valuable insights on threat actor activity, detection, and mitigation techniques.
    • Proactively monitor the effectiveness of risk-based information security strategy, the security controls applied, and the proper implementation of security technologies, followed by corrective actions, remediations, and lessons learned.
    • Consider implementing Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) security systems to compensate for the shortcomings of EDR and SIEM solutions.
    • Detection processes are tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events. Timely communication of anomalies should be continuously evolved to keep up with refined ransomware threats.

    TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
    • Consider using security automation to speed up threat detection, improved incident response, increased the visibility of security metrics, and rapid execution of security checklists.
    • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening the defences based on the tactical intelligence provided.
    • Deploy detection technologies that are behavioral anomaly-based to detect ransomware attacks and help to take appropriate measures.
    • Implement a combination of security control such as reCAPTCHA (completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and Account lockout to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
    • Ensure email and web content filtering uses real-time blocklists, reputation services, and other similar mechanisms to avoid accepting content from known and potentially malicious sources.

    Situational Awareness – Cyber News

    Please find the Geography-Wise and Industry-Wise breakup of cyber news for the last 5 days as part of the situational awareness pillar.

    For situational awareness intelligence and specific insights mapped to your organisation’s geography, industry, and technology, please access DeCYFIR.